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CONSTITUTION-MAKING GONE WRONG 
David Landau* 
ABSTRACT 
With the recent wave of regime change in the Middle East, the process 
of constitution-making must again become a central concern for those 
interested in comparative law and politics. The conception of constitutional 
politics associated with Jon Elster and Bruce Ackerman views constitution-
making as a potentially higher form of lawmaking with different dynamics 
than ordinary politics and states that, ideally, constitution-making should 
be designed so as to be a relatively deliberative process where the role of 
group and institutional interests is deemphasized. I argue that a focus on 
achieving deliberation and transformation through constitution-making is 
unrealistic in certain situations and that theorists should instead often 
focus on avoiding worst-case scenarios of authoritarian regimes or 
breakdowns of order. Constitution-making moments must not be idealized; 
they are often traumatic events. In these situations, the central challenge of 
constitution-making is not to achieve a higher form of lawmaking but 
rather to constrain unilateral exercises of power. I use two recent Latin 
American examples where the constitution-making process was 
problematic to illustrate the difficulty. If political forces in assemblies are 
left unconstrained or poorly constrained, they can reshape politics to 
create a quasi-authoritarian regime (as occurred in Venezuela), or their 
attempt to impose a constitution on a reticent minority may create a 
constitutional breakdown (as nearly occurred in Bolivia). Some of the 
normative recommendations of followers of the dominant model—for 
example, that constitution-making should be highly participatory and 
should be undertaken in a specialized constituent assembly—emerge as 
problematic under this reconceptualization because they may increase the 
likelihood of a worst-case outcome. Finally, I apply my theory in order to 
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get some analytic leverage on the current constitution-making process in 
Egypt. Contrary to most observers, I argue that the military may be playing 
a pro-democratic role by helping to constrain otherwise dominant electoral 
groups. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The events of the Arab Spring have again placed constitution-making 
at the forefront of the agenda for scholars of comparative constitutional law 
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and comparative politics. While the media has fixated on the dramatic falls 
of authoritarian regimes in places like Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, the events 
that are occurring after the regimes have fallen will play a significant role 
in determining the future of these countries. The hope is that all of these 
countries will become stable, competitive democracies, but a vast literature 
in comparative politics makes clear that this is far from an inevitable 
outcome. New democracies in weakly institutionalized environments may 
as plausibly become quasi-authoritarian regimes or unstable states. 
The key question, then, is how to structure constitution-making 
processes so as to enhance the prospects that the resulting regime will be a 
stable and competitive democracy. Since Jon Elster noted fifteen years ago 
that the field was markedly understudied,1 there has been an outpouring of 
high-quality case studies and empirical analyses of constitution-making 
episodes.2 But the literature has continued to be dominated by his 
theoretical conception—that the central challenge of constitution-making is 
to create an opportunity for constitutional politics to be distinct from 
normal politics, where constitution makers can debate long-term issues 
relatively free from the influence of short-term individual, group, or 
institutional interest. This conception is closely related to Bruce 
Ackerman’s notion of “dualism,” that there are periods of time when 
polities enjoy “constitutional moments,” during which the public is more 
engaged with political affairs and politics as a whole is more deliberative 
than normal. 
In this Article I argue that the “dualist” vision of constitution-making is 
an overly optimistic way to conceptualize constitution-making. I rely on 
recent examples where Latin American constitution-making had deeply 
problematic effects in Venezuela (1999) and Bolivia (2006–2009). I argue 
that political figures often use constitution-making to carry out their short-
term political goals and what differentiates normal political periods from 
constitution-making periods in these cases is not the motives of the actors 
but rather the absence of stable rules and institutions. Constitution-making 
is often undertaken in situations in which existing political institutions have 
broken down, and the constitution-making process itself is often a 
challenge to the legitimacy of remaining institutions. The absence of the 
channeling functions played by political institutions during normal periods 
can make constitution-making moments particularly dangerous: strongmen 
or individual parties can manipulate temporary majorities in order to 
reshape the political system in a manner that is not conducive to 
 
1. See Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J. 364, 
364 (“[T]here is not, to my knowledge, a single book or even article that considers the process of 
constitution-making, in its full generality, as a distinctive object of positive analysis.”). 
2. For an overview, see infra Part II. 
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competitive democracy. In Venezuela, for example, President Chávez was 
able to seize sole control over constitution-making in 1999 and to use that 
control to marginalize opposition groups. The result has been a competitive 
authoritarian regime that persists to this day. A second risk is that attempts 
by groups to impose unilateral constitutions will exacerbate fissures 
between groups and lead to a fundamental breakdown of order—this very 
nearly occurred in Bolivia in 2008 before majority and minority forces 
were able to impose a “pacted” constitution. 
Thus, in many situations, the central challenge of the design of 
constitutional politics may be in finding ways to control uses of power, and 
in particular, in ensuring that powerful individuals and groups are not able 
to use the constitution-making process to impose unilateral projects, rather 
than in switching politics onto its higher track. Such a conception of 
constitution-making views it as an essentially preservative rather than 
transformative process: it seeks to avoid worst-case outcomes that come 
from abuses of the process rather than aspiring to create the ideal state. 
This conception in turn casts some of the key design recommendations 
from existing literature in a more problematic light. For example, most 
analysts argue in favor of making constitution-making very participatory, 
but as the Bolivian example shows, high levels of participation during 
constitutional moments can sometimes threaten the constitutional process 
and stability of the state. Further, the debate about whether to write 
constitutions in ordinary legislatures or specialized parliamentary 
assemblies may hinge not on the question of which body is more likely to 
produce higher-track lawmaking, but instead on the likelihood that 
constitutional assemblies may be harder for external institutions like courts 
and legislatures to control. Finally, this perspective shines light on the need 
to make constraints credible. Evidence from all three countries studied here 
indicates that oft-suggested models relying on external institutions, and 
particularly courts, to control assemblies may fail in many situations. When 
push comes to shove, courts may lack the legitimacy and capacity to 
control constitution makers. 
I close by using my framework to gain some analytic leverage on 
recent events surrounding the constitution-making process in Egypt.3 Some 
observers have seen the Egyptian process as a potentially “dualist 
democracy” moment, but I argue that it is probably more fruitful to focus 
on avoiding a worst-case outcome. A series of factors have potentially 
made the risks of unilateral exercises of power quite high in the Egyptian 
case: elections were timed for a period in which some political forces were 
much more organized than others, there was a near-consensus rejection of 
 
3. See infra Part V. 
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attempts to bind the constitutional assembly by a set of principles or by 
some other means, and actors and analysts have adopted a position that the 
military must be wholly extracted from its political role as quickly as 
possible. The military—which has typically been seen as an anti-
democratic force—emerges under this theory as a more complex actor that, 
under certain conditions, may help to stabilize democracy in the country. 
This analysis adds to other recent work, led by Sam Issacharoff, which 
suggests that new and threatened democracies may need to include some 
undemocratic enclaves or institutions in order to protect themselves from 
democratic breakdowns.4 
The rest of this Article is structured as follows. In Part II, I lay out the 
conception of constitutional politics held by Elster and Ackerman, show 
how it infuses much of the work in the field, and then critique that vision 
by stating that the central concern of constitution-making should instead be 
on controlling unilateral exercises of power. Part III contains the two case 
studies of Venezuela and Bolivia. I focus here on how a lack of constraint 
allowed for the construction of an undemocratic or weakly democratic 
regime (Venezuela) and how attempts to control an assembly externally, 
particularly when coupled with high mass mobilization, caused a chaotic 
struggle that nearly led to a democratic breakdown (Bolivia). Part IV raises 
some implications from the argument, focusing on the need to make 
constraints credible and effective and the drawbacks of very high levels of 
participation. Part V applies the theoretical lens to Egypt, showing how 
much of the discourse and design seems to misperceive the main challenges 
involved in constitution-making, and Part VI concludes. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS AS NORMAL (BUT DANGEROUS) POLITICS 
A. The Dominant Conception 
The concept of constitution-making as a special moment that is 
qualitatively different from ordinary politics has its roots in theorists like 
Sieyés and Schmitt. Sieyés for example is often cited as the original 
exponent of the idea of “original constituent power.” Sieyés argued in 
essence that the representative bodies of a given state get their power from 
the people, and the people thus retain a residual right to alter any of the 
 
4. See Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1415 (2007) (arguing 
that weaker democracies may need to have mechanisms in place that limit the rights of extremist groups 
as a means of self-preservation); see also Ozan Varol, The Democratic Coup d’État, 53 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 292, 293–94 (2012) (arguing that militaries are not necessarily anti-democratic actors during 
democratic transitions). 
         
928 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 64:5:923 
institutions of a political order.5 Constitution-making, therefore, involves 
the right of the people, acting in an extraordinary body, to step outside of 
the existing political order and to remake it. 
But the most sophisticated modern exponent of this idea is Jon Elster. 
Elster understands that short-term conceptions of interest (whether 
individual, group-based, or institutional) will always play a substantial role 
in any political process, including constitution-making.6 But he argues that 
constitution-making calls for “impartial and far-sighted reasoning,” which 
require that members of a constitution-making body be motived by 
conceptions of a broader, longer-term public interest.7 Elster believes that it 
is difficult but possible to construct an assembly that will in part be 
motivated by reason and the public interest rather than by narrower 
conceptions of interest. Some members of an assembly will be motivated 
by a broader public interest at least some of the time,8 and the process of 
deliberation may itself change preferences.9 
Thus, to Elster the central challenge of constitution-making is to design 
an assembly that will not be unduly influenced by narrow conceptions of 
self-interest.10 He notes that ordinary legislatures are likely to be more 
influenced by group and institutional self-interest and recommends that 
constitution-making be undertaken by a specialized assembly.11 Ordinary 
legislatures should be given no role either in writing a new constitution or 
in ratifying one.12 Moreover, he recommends a balance between publicity 
and secrecy, since secrecy helps constituents reach hard bargains on 
difficult issues, while publicity ensures that conceptions of the public 
interest and principle play a significant role in the constitution-making 
process.13 
 
5. See EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYÉS, WHAT IS THE THIRD ESTATE? (S.E. Finer ed., M. Blondel 
trans., 1963). 
6. See Elster, supra note 1, at 376–86 (listing types of motivations that might influence 
constitution makers and discussing their importance); see also JON ELSTER, CLAUS OFFE & ULRICH K. 
PREUSS, INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES: REBUILDING THE SHIP AT SEA 77 
(1998) (“[I]nterest may be the most important motivation in most constituent assemblies . . . .”). 
7. See Elster, supra note 1, at 396. 
8. See id. at 379–80 (“Although it is true that self-serving arguments tend to dress themselves in 
public-interest garbs, the converse argument—that all impartial argument is nothing but self-interest in 
disguise—is invalid.”); see also ELSTER ET AL., supra note 6, at 78 (referring to the “civilizing force of 
hypocrisy” in ensuring that some appeals to the public interest are real (emphasis omitted)). 
9. See Elster, supra note 1, at 387–88 (discussing “transformation of preferences through 
discussion” (emphasis omitted)). 
10. See id. at 394 (“[T]he intrinsic importance of constitution-making requires that procedures be 
based on rational, impartial argument.”). 
11. See id. at 395 (referring to this as the “most important” normative recommendation). 
12. See id.; see also ELSTER ET AL., supra note 6, at 78 (arguing that publicizing deliberations can 
help to ensure that arguments are actually based on self-interest but that publicity may lock competing 
interests into “uncompromising situations”). 
13. See Elster, supra note 1, at 395. 
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Elster’s ideas are rooted in similar notions to those that inform the 
work of Bruce Ackerman. Ackerman argues that politics is inherently 
dualist.14 Normally, politics works on an ordinary track where citizens 
themselves have a “limited engagement in public life”—citizens vote but 
otherwise take relatively little account of public affairs.15 Meanwhile, 
private interest groups, bureaucracies, and political parties ensure that the 
system works well enough at aggregating citizen preferences into political 
outcomes.16 But in extraordinary moments, politics can also move on a 
second, higher track. In these moments, a far higher percentage of the 
public pays close attention to public affairs than in times of ordinary 
politics.17 Indeed, the polity takes on a character of “mobilized 
deliberation,” with members of all political groups debating fundamental 
ideas in front of broad swaths of the citizenry.18 Ordinary political 
allegiances do not disappear during such periods, but citizens are somewhat 
transformed—the barriers of “apathy, ignorance, [and] selfishness” that 
govern most citizens during times of ordinary politics dissipate.19 The 
broad and deep public discussion that takes place during extraordinary 
moments of constitutional politics helps to reorient the basic 
understandings of the polity. 
B. Implications of the Dominant Conception 
This conception of constitutional politics has been influential in the 
literature on constitution-making. In this Part, I explore this influence, 
focusing on three major implications of the model: the view that 
constitutional conventions rather than ordinary legislatures should be used 
to draft new constitutions, the view that the power of these assemblies 
should properly be left unrestricted by other political actors in the system, 
and the view that constitution-making should be a particularly participatory 
event. 
 
14. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). Ackerman’s chief point is 
that “constitutional moments,” where the higher track is active, can occur without formal constitutional 
change. He argues that both Reconstruction and the New Deal constituted such moments even though 
these were not constitution-writing moments. See id. at 34–57. But the moment of actually writing a 
constitution is a paradigmatic case of higher-track politics: indeed, he views the founding as the third 
constitutional moment in U.S. political history. See id. at 58–80. 
15. See id. at 234; see also id. at 236–41 (explaining the importance of voting during ordinary 
political moments). 
16. See id. at 243–51 (making an inventory of “normal political resources” like parties and 
interest groups). 
17. See id. at 266–94. 
18. Id. at 285–88. 
19. See id. at 287. 
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1. Constitution-Making Should Be Done by a Specialized Assembly 
As noted above, Elster has argued that writing constitutions in 
specialized constituent assemblies rather than in ordinary legislatures will 
help to reduce the role of narrow conceptions of interest in the process.20 
Constitutional assemblies will be less likely to adopt decisions either for 
partisan ends or in order to aggrandize their own institutional power. 
Indeed, he considers this point to be the “most important” normative 
recommendation governing constitution-making.21 Elster’s point has 
received considerable support from other scholars. For example, Keith 
Rosenn has argued that the Brazilian constitution is extraordinarily long, 
lacked coherence, and is laden down with banal political pacts, largely 
because it was written by an ordinary congress rather than a specialized 
assembly.22 He argues in particular that the ordinary congress had a “short-
term perspective and agenda,” which was not conducive to constitutional 
politics,23 and that the congress was driven by institutional self-interest to 
aggrandize its own power in the final constitution.24 And in a recent edited 
volume collecting detailed information on constitution-making processes 
from around the world, Miller concludes that specialized assemblies have 
“several advantages” over ordinary legislatures, most importantly a higher 
degree of “popular legitimacy.”25 
The view that constitutional assemblies are desirable to achieve a 
genuine constitutional moment is not, however, unanimous. Arato argues 
that “parliamentary constitution making” may do a better job of ensuring 
the legitimacy of the constitutional product.26 He notes for example that 
ordinary political bodies may help ensure that constitutions are written by 
consensus and may help ensure that there is a public perception of legal 
continuity.27 Further, he argues that the chief value sought by Elster—that 
constitution-making be done behind a “veil of ignorance” that limits the 
scope for individuals, groups, and institutions to pursue their narrow self-
 
20. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
21. See Elster, supra note 1, at 394. 
22. See Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil’s New Constitution  An Exercise in Transient Constitutionalism 
for a Transitional Society, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 773, 775–77 (1990). 
23. See Keith S. Rosenn, Conflict Resolution and Constitutionalism  The Making of the Brazilian 
Constitution of 1988, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN 
CONSTITUTION MAKING 435, 441 (Laurel E. Miller ed., 2010). 
24. See id. at 441 (“[A]s a basic political player, Congress had a clear conflict of interest. It is not 
surprising that the constitutional document that Congress drafted aggrandizes congressional power and 
confers numerous favors and entitlements upon states, counties, and special-interest groups.”). 
25. See Laurel E. Miller, Designing Constitution-Making Processes  Lessons from the Past, 
Questions for the Future, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION, supra note 23, at 601, 612. 
26. See ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY, CONSTITUTION, AND LEGITIMACY 255–56 (2000). 
27. See id. at 255. 
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interest—may be achieved within an ordinary legislature as well as within a 
specialized constituent assembly.28 Further, Partlett recently argued that 
constitutional assemblies may be inferior to ordinary legislatures because 
they may be easier for would-be strongmen in a given country to control 
and, thus, may lead to the construction of constitutions that are 
authoritarian or weakly democratic.29 
In Subpart IV.B, below, I return to this debate in light of the case 
studies of Venezuela and Bolivia that I carry out in Part III. I suggest that 
this debate may be less relevant than it has often been portrayed in the 
existing literature. If the key to constitution-making is ensuring that 
unilateral exercises of power are checked, this might be achievable in either 
a constituent assembly or in an ordinary legislative body. However, there is 
some evidence from my case studies and from elsewhere that constituent 
assemblies may be particularly difficult for external institutions to control; 
they are still linked in the minds of domestic judges and domestic 
politicians to a view that they are completely sovereign over the rest of the 
legal order. If this is true, it suggests that ordinary political bodies make 
safer constitution makers. 
2. The Constitution-Making Body Should Have Unlimited Power 
The view championed by both Sieyés and Schmitt is that constitution-
making bodies must be “sovereign” and thus placed over the rest of the 
state.30 Schmitt, for example, believes that the constitutional assembly is a 
“sovereign dictator,” which exercises all powers within the state while it 
 
28. For example, Arato argues that the ordinary legislature can be incentivized to select a new 
electoral rule during the constitution-making process and that the resulting uncertainty will help to 
construct such a “veil of ignorance.” See id. at 252–53. He also points out that there is significant scope 
for group self-interest even during a constituent assembly. See id. 
29. See William Partlett, Making Constitutions Matter  The Dangers of Constitutional Politics in 
Current Post-Authoritarian Constitution-Making, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 19–34 (2012) (drawing off 
of the experience of President Yeltsin in Russia to show how a president was able to switch the 
constitution-making process from the ordinary parliament to a specialized constituent assembly in order 
to control it). In recent work Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount found no empirical support for a claim that 
institutions tended to aggrandize their own institutional interest during the constitution-making process, 
except for the fact that presidents tend to create stronger presidencies when they have substantial power. 
See Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins & Justin Blount, Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?, 
5 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 201, 213 tbl.2 (2009). This may be explained by the fact that actors are often 
motivated by goals other than institutional aggrandizement; moreover, in multi-member bodies 
institutional interests are often swamped by the interests of political parties. See Daryl J. Levinson & 
Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006) (arguing that 
U.S. constitutional doctrine misunderstands separation of powers by assuming that institutions resist 
one another even when controlled by the same party); Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government 
in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915 (2005) (arguing that the assumption that institutions 
always seek to aggrandize their own power is false). 
30. See SIEYÉS, supra note 5, at 130–33; CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 125–26 
(Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., 2008). 
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remains in force.31 The idea that the constituent assembly is uncontrollable 
by other institutions is, classically, closely linked to a preference for 
constituent assemblies and to the dualist theory of constitutional politics in 
general. The assembly represents the people acting in their role as the 
constituting power and must be placed above the currently existing political 
institutions, which represent the constituted power.32 
As I show below in Part III, this vision remains important in 
constitution-making practice: both politicians and courts, at least in Latin 
America, continue to believe that the constituent assembly, which speaks in 
the name of the people exercising their constituent power, must be placed 
above the rest of the state and must have the power to reconstitute other 
political institutions at will. Some recent scholarship also supports this 
view, arguing that this conception creates space for participatory 
democracy and allows for moments when “the people” can make their most 
fundamental political decisions directly—free from the constraints of 
ordinary politics.33 Elster acknowledges that external constraints can be put 
on the constitution-making process, but he argues that such constraints are 
unlikely to work in practice and does not recommend any of these as part 
of his normative recommendations.34 
In contrast, under the theory I develop here, external constraints on the 
constitution-making body emerge as a key concern. Constitution-making 
can be easily hijacked by individuals or groups who temporarily enjoy 
large amounts of power in order to enhance their own position. It can 
constitute an end-run around existing political institutions not for the 
benefit of “the people” but rather for the benefit of the particular political 
force involved. These unilateral exercises of political power can be checked 
 
31. See SCHMITT, supra note 30, at 109. 
32. See SIEYÉS, supra note 5, at 130–33. 
33. See, e.g., Joel I. Colón-Ríos, Carl Schmitt and Constituent Power in Latin American Courts  
The Cases of Venezuela and Colombia, 18 CONSTELLATIONS 365, 377–78 (2011) [hereinafter Colón-
Ríos, Carl Schmitt]; Joel I. Colón-Ríos, The Legitimacy of the Juridical  Constituent Power, 
Democracy, and the Limits of Constitutional Reform, 48 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 199 (2010) [hereinafter 
Colón-Ríos, Legitimacy] . 
34. See Elster, supra note 1, at 374–75 (noting cases like the United States where constituent 
assemblies ignored instructions from their “upstream” creators). This perspective has also been subject 
to challenge. Arato, for example, has argued for a post-sovereign model, where the constituent 
assembly does not have full power over other institutions or even over the constitutional text. See 
ANDREW ARATO, CONSTITUTION MAKING UNDER OCCUPATION 71–72 (2009). In particular, Arato calls 
for a two-stage model similar to the South African constitutional process, where an initial, temporary 
constitution is produced via pacting and where sets of principles in that interim document bind the final 
constitutional assembly. A court, finally, assesses whether the final constitution is in accord with the 
basic principles of the interim text. See id. at 62–64. Arato argues that this process, most importantly, 
allows for the possibility of “facilitating learning” between the two stages of the text. See id. at 69; see 
also ULRICH K. PREUSS, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: THE LINK BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND PROGRESS 95–105 (Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., 1995) (arguing that the roundtable processes 
of constitutional change used in Eastern Europe constituted a new and better model of constitution-
making). 
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in either of two ways: by ensuring sufficient diversity within the assembly 
itself or by placing external limits on what the assembly can do such as 
subjecting it to review by courts, ordinary congresses, et cetera. I return to 
the question of how best to check constitution-making bodies in Subpart 
IV.A. 
3. The Constitutional Process Should Be Highly Participatory 
A third implication of existing literature has been a widespread (but not 
unanimous) emphasis on making constitutional politics participatory.35 This 
idea is again tightly linked to dualism. As Ackerman has argued, these 
moments of “higher lawmaking” are distinct from “ordinary politics” in the 
sense that they involve “mobilized [popular] deliberation” where “[a]pathy 
will give way to concern, ignorance to information, [and] selfishness to 
serious reflection on the country’s future . . . .”36 Participation is said to 
increase the legitimacy of the constitution-making process: it “fosters 
political dialogue and empowers the people.”37 Constitutions without a 
large amount of participation may therefore be “vulnerable to 
undermining.”38 Moreover, participation is said to improve the quality of 
the final constitutional product: elite discussions provide a “narrow focus,” 
while participation can “provide[] a space in which innovative solutions 
and approaches to problems can emerge that are qualitatively better than 
the solutions and approaches developed in elite or exclusive settings.”39 
 
35. In particular, Elster recognizes that excessive “publicity” of a constitutional assembly may 
obstruct a deal, because the public may not allow actors to make necessary compromises. See Elster, 
supra note 1, at 388–89. 
36. See ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 6–7, 287. 
37. KIRSTI SAMUELS & VANESSA HAWKINS WYETH, STATE-BUILDING AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
DESIGN AFTER CONFLICT 3 (2006); see also Laurel E. Miller, Designing Constitution-Making 
Processes  Lessons from the Past, Questions for the Future, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF 
TRANSITION, supra note 23, at 601, 636 (noting that the “case studies and thematic chapters on the 
whole regard public participation as valuable in terms of democratizing the constitution-making 
process,” although noting that some unanswered questions remain). But see Kirsti Samuels, 
Constitution Building Processes and Democratization  A Discussion of Twelve Case Studies 27 (Int’l 
Inst. for Democracy & Electoral Assistance, Working Paper, 2005) (concluding that an important 
tradeoff to broader participation is that the “constitutions tend[] to threaten the established power 
structures, which [may react] by undermining the constitutions, amending them, preventing their 
adoption, or preventing their enforcement”). 
38. See SAMUELS & WYETH, supra note 37, at 5. 
39. Angela M. Banks, Expanding Participation in Constitution Making  Challenges and 
Opportunities, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1043, 1050 (2008); see also Kirsti Samuels, Post-Conflict 
Peace-Building and Constitution-Making, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 663, 670 (2006) (“The use of more 
participatory and inclusive processes . . . to broaden the constitutional agenda and prevent the process 
from degenerating into a mere division of spoils between powerful players.”). In recent empirical work, 
Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount find support for the idea that constitutions that include a referendum 
procedure requiring ratification by the public include more rights provisions overall. See Ginsburg et 
al., supra note 29, at 217–18. 
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Finally, participation in constitution-making is thought to improve the civic 
virtue of citizens by increasing their familiarity with and trust in 
governance.40 Thomas Franck and Vivien Hart, in surveying state practice, 
have gone so far as to state that participation in constitution-making is an 
emerging norm of customary international law and indeed is virtually the 
only international norm governing the area.41 The recommendation in favor 
of participation is particularly widespread in policy papers and in the work 
of analysts who are close to international organizations like the U.N.; thus, 
the norm in favor of participation has played a significant role in the actual 
practice of constitution-making, especially in the many countries where 
international bodies have played a significant role.42 
I return to this point in Subpart III.C, arguing that if constitutional 
politics is viewed as ordinary politics rather than in the dualist mode, 
participation may in some cases appear as more of a hindrance than a help 
to the constitutional process. A high degree of popular participation within 
a poorly institutionalized environment may, as occurred in Bolivia, 
destabilize the constitutional process; the frequency of mass protests on 
both sides, and the ability of all actors to turn out their bases, may make it 
impossible for elites to reach agreement on key matters. This is particularly 
relevant for current constitution-making efforts in places like Egypt, facing 
similarly high degrees of mass mobilization. 
C. An Agenda for the Second Best 
To a large extent, the classical theorists in the field, like Sieyés and 
Schmitt, are unconcerned with the practical implications of their theories. 
Their assertion instead is that there is a necessary logical relationship 
between constituted institutions (like legislatures) and constituting forces 
(the people): the latter must have the power to remake the former. The 
problem with this assertion is that a focus on logical or formal necessity 
should give way to a focus on the consequences of the argument. In other 
words, rather than focusing on whether the “people” must possess a power 
 
40. See, e.g., VIVIEN HART, U.S. INST. PEACE, SPECIAL REP. NO. 107: DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION MAKING 11 (2003), available at http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr107.pdf. 
41. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 
46 (1992); Thomas M. Franck & Arun K. Thiruvengadam, Norms of International Law Relating to the 
Constitution-Making Process, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION, supra note 23, at 3, 14 
(“A survey of the practice of the international system in the application of treaty law and custom reveals 
no firm evidence of rules applicable to the process of constitution making. What does appear, however, 
is a general requirement of public participation in governance.”); Vivien Hart, Constitution Making and 
the Right to Take Part in a Public Affair, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION, supra note 
23, at 20, 42 (“‘Public affairs’ is now assumed to include the making of a nation’s constitution, and 
‘taking part’ is an established right.”). 
42. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 40; Samuels, supra note 39, at 665, 670. 
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to remake the state at any time, we should focus on the likely practical 
consequences of such a power. As I demonstrate below, such a power is 
likely to greatly increase the risk of destabilizing outcomes and worst-case 
scenarios. 
However, modern theorists of the constitutional moment hypothesis, 
like Eslter and Ackerman, do focus on consequences rather than logical 
necessity. It is simply that, as I argue here, they focus on the wrong likely 
outcomes of these processes. One might see the constitution-making model 
proposed by Elster and Ackerman as a first-best model. The goal is to 
include all groups in a deliberative moment, which will, in a relatively 
consensual manner, determine the future course of the polity. The call for 
participation by various scholars adds yet another dimension: the 
constitution-making moment will bring in actors who have traditionally 
been excluded from ordinary politics, and these actors will enrich the 
constitutional text and help to deepen the quality of the democracy. The 
resulting constitutional text will be transformative—it will not, of course, 
solve all of a country’s problems, but it will set the country on a 
considerably better course than it was on previously. The South African 
constitution-making process is often held up as a model of first-best or 
transformative constitution-making.43 Although the design of the process 
diverged in important ways from Elster’s recommendations, the process 
and outcome in many ways resembled such a first-best model.44 The 
process appears to have been genuinely deliberative and highly 
participatory, with participation having important impacts on the final 
text.45 This has made the South African constitutional process (as well as 
the final text) a paragon for many constitutional theorists. 
But the South African experience may have rested on conditions that 
will not always hold. Both of the major players were committed early on to 
a pacted democracy within relatively narrow limits—many major 
differences were taken off the table early, and there was a shared will about 
the type of system to create.46 The constitution-making occurred under 
 
43. See, e.g., Heinz Klug, Participating in the Design  Constitution-Making in South Africa, 3 
REV. CONST. STUD. 18 (1996) (arguing that South Africa represents an example of a successful 
constitution-making experience that was genuinely participatory); ARATO, supra note 34, at 59–97 
(holding up the South Africa example as a potential model for Iraq). 
44. In particular, the process in South Africa was what Arato calls “post-sovereign.” See ARATO, 
supra note 34, at 59–97. Rather than relying on an unconstrained constituent assembly, South Africa 
relied on a complex, highly constrained, two-stage process. In the first stage, parties agreed on a pacted, 
interim constitution. In the second stage, an elected parliament, doubling as a constituent assembly, 
wrote a permanent constitution subject to a set of principles agreed to in the interim draft. The 
Constitutional Court verified whether the final text complied with the principles in the interim draft. See 
id. at 72–86. 
45. See Klug, supra note 43. 
46. See, e.g., Cyril Ramaphosa, Negotiating a New Nation  Reflections on the Development of 
South Africa’s Constitution, in THE POST-APARTHEID CONSTITUTIONS: PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH 
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favorable conditions of international pressure; other countries were able to 
put significant leverage on both sides to agree to a particular conception of 
constitutional democracy.47 Finally, and probably most importantly, the 
country retained significant degrees of institutional capacity.48 The 
judiciary and the rest of the state had significant capacity that was never 
destroyed.49 
In other cases, there may be little prospect for genuinely transformative 
constitutionalism. In particular, states will often face the dilemma initially 
posed by Sam Huntington: a situation where political institutions have 
either broken down or are very weak and where the central challenge faced 
is the reorganization and reconstruction of these institutions.50 Such a world 
faces a serious prospect of one of two worst-case outcomes: either the void 
in organization is not filled, leading to chaos and violence, or the void is 
filled by an outright authoritarian regime or by a competitive authoritarian 
regime led by a strongman or single-party system.51 
The design of constitutional politics must often be aimed at avoiding 
these worst-case scenarios rather than in reaching best-case outcomes. In 
these cases, the central question in our theories of constitution-making is 
not how do we achieve a truly deliberative constitutional process so as to 
achieve a first-best, transformative outcome? It is instead: how do we 
manage to reach a second-best outcome in lieu of the two worst-case 
scenarios outlined above?52 This second-best outcome is likely to be some 
variant of competitive democracy; a constitution written under such 
conditions is unlikely to be transformative in the South African sense, but it 
 
AFRICA’S BASIC LAW 71, 77–80 (Penelope Andrews & Stephen Ellmann eds., 2001) [hereinafter THE 
POST-APARTHEID CONSTITUTIONS] (explaining the course of the roundtable discussions). 
47. See Klug, supra note 43, at 22–29 (noting the role of international actors in the South African 
transition). 
48. See JENS MEIERHENRICH, THE LEGACIES OF LAW: LONG-RUN CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1652–2000, at 202 (2008) (explaining the importance of legal 
institutions and the rule of law in the transition from Apartheid). 
49. Id. at 197–202, 277, 290–91. 
50. See SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 1–10 (1968). 
51. See id.; see also STEVEN LEVITSKY & LUCAN A. WAY, COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM: 
HYBRID REGIMES AFTER THE COLD WAR 56 (2010) (explaining how competitive authoritarian regimes 
have been a response to the breakdown of order in various regions after the end of the Cold War and 
how divergence in regime trajectory is largely explained by success in organizing power within the state 
and the party). 
52. See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, Judicial Reform in Developing Economies  Constraints 
and Opportunities, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 2007: 
BEYOND TRANSITION 311, 320–25 (Francois Bourguignon & Boris Pleskovic eds., 2007) (describing 
and applying the theory of the “second best” to understand unintended consequences in judicial 
reform); see also Judith N. Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, in POLITICAL THOUGHT AND POLITICAL 
THINKERS 3, 9 (Stanley Hoffmann ed., 1998) (arguing for a liberalism that is “less inclined to celebrate 
the blessings of liberty than to consider the dangers of tyranny”). 
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will at least avoid either a breakdown of order or an authoritarian or quasi-
authoritarian regime. 
This in turn suggests that an important goal of modern constitution-
making should be to control unilateral or imposed exercises of power by 
particular groups or individuals. Experience across regions has shown that 
both strongmen and individual parties, unchecked by either institutions or 
other movements, will often take steps to consolidate their own power by 
weakening nascent democratic institutions.53 These steps are sometimes 
taken in the text of the constitution, where strongmen, for example, create 
strong presidencies, but as I show in the case of Venezuela, they are also 
often undertaken via more informal means linked to reconfigurations of 
political power that surround the political process. Further, attempts to 
unilaterally impose constitutions on unwilling oppositions may create a 
near breakdown or total breakdown of order, as I show in the example of 
Bolivia below. 
Thus, in the case studies that follow, I track the degrees to which 
unilateral political movements or individuals are restrained in their 
ambitions and are forced to compromise with other political forces. Internal 
diversity is important because, where no single political force or actor 
controls enough seats to unilaterally push through their program, actors 
must compromise with other political groups. External constraints, when a 
constitution-making body is subject to rules placed upon it by other 
institutions such as a court or ordinary legislative body, may also restrain 
unilateral exercises of power. Further, following the central concern with 
the topic in existing literature, I track the degree to which the process is 
participatory by trying to gauge the extent to which the general public and 
civil society are involved in shaping the process. 
First, the case studies show that constitution-making is often dominated 
by the short-term political motives of the various groups involved rather 
than by longer term conceptions of public interest. In Venezuela, President 
Chávez undertook the constitutional process in order to be able to fatally 
weaken other political institutions (like the congress, the courts, and the 
subnational governments) that were still controlled by opposition groups. 
In Bolivia, both President Morales’s Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) 
movement and opposition parties sought to use the constitutional process in 
order to strengthen their political position with their base and to 
 
53. See, e.g., Partlett, supra note 29 (exploring cases in Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan); Muna 
Ndulo, Zimbabwe’s Unfulfilled Struggle for a Legitimate Constitutional Order, in FRAMING THE STATE 
IN TIMES OF TRANSITION, supra note 23, at 176, 183–88 (explaining how those in power in Zibwabwe 
manipulated various constitution-making processes to serve their own ends); Allan R. Brewer-Carías, 
The 1999 Venezuelan Constitution-Making Process as an Instrument for Framing the Development of 
an Authoritarian Political Regime, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION, supra note 23, at 
505. 
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delegitimize the other side. Thus, although there was a widespread will for 
a new constitution in both cases, the agendas of constitution-making 
responded to the needs of the various parties, and in no case was there 
much of a real deliberation about the long-term public interest. 
Further, the case studies demonstrate that the perils of constitution-
making that I have outlined above are real. In Venezuela, it is clear that 
President Chávez took advantage of an assembly called in a weak 
institutional environment to set up a durable competitive authoritarian 
regime. And in Bolivia, it is equally clear that a highly participatory and 
polarized process regulated by a weakly defined set of rules exacerbated 
tensions and nearly caused the breakdown of the state. Like many acts of 
constitution-making in the developing world, these cases involved 
constitution-making under weakly institutionalized conditions. In such 
conditions, there are substantial threats of either disorder or of an imposed, 
non-democratic order. Bolivia is a clear example of a case where very high 
levels of participation in a poorly institutionalized environment hindered an 
agreement that could have otherwise been made and nearly caused the 
country to collapse into violence.54 Since many countries write 
constitutions in similar conditions with a highly mobilized (and partisan) 
populace—like Egypt—the Bolivia example may be relevant as a warning 
to current constitution-making exercises.55 
Finally, the results suggest that exercising control over constitution-
making bodies is often difficult. In both cases, assemblies were not 
sufficiently internally diverse, so opposition forces tried to rely on external 
institutions to constrain them. But these constraints proved to be highly 
unstable: In Venezuela, judicially imposed limits on the constitutional 
assembly were ignored and eventually abandoned. In Bolivia, limits 
imposed by the ordinary Congress were violently contested, although they 
eventually held. Thus, while much existing work essentially assumes the 
efficacy of external constraints placed on constitution makers, the case 
studies suggest that these constraints will not prove to be credible in some 
cases, particularly when the constraining institution is a court.56 I return to 
the need to find constraints on unilateral action, and the difficulty in finding 
such constraints, in Subpart IV.A below. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS GONE WRONG: TWO CASES 
In this Part I look closely at two recent constitution-making processes 
from the Andes in Latin America: the Venezuelan constitutional process of 
 
54. See infra Subpart IV.C. 
55. For a discussion of the Egyptian case in light of the studies carried out here, see infra Part IV. 
56. See infra Subpart IV.A. 
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1999 and the Bolivian process of 2006 through 2009. These constitutional 
processes occurred under similar political conditions. In both cases, durable 
political regimes based on explicit, power-sharing pacts between traditional 
parties were disintegrating. These pacts were able to govern the two 
countries via stable (if restricted) democracy for long periods of time, but 
by the time in which new constitutions were being written, the exclusionary 
nature and/or pervasive corruption of these regimes had caused fatal crises 
of legitimacy and had severely undermined democratic institutions. In both 
cases, outsiders sought to circumvent and rebuild existing political 
institutions by calling constituent assemblies. 
The two cases demonstrate two different dangers of modern 
constitutional politics. In one scenario, a powerful group or party uses its 
unilateral power over a constitution-making process to entrench an 
authoritarian or competitive authoritarian regime; this was the pathway 
taken in Venezuela. In a second scenario, constitution-making exacerbates 
conflicts between rival groups, leading to a breakdown in order; as very 
nearly occurred in Bolivia before a pacted constitution emerged as a partial 
solution. In both cases, the construction of the constitution-making process 
proved problematic. In Venezuela, the problem was that the insurgent 
movement faced no opposition inside the assembly and could not be 
constrained by external actors—this allowed the majority to use the 
assembly to marginalize the remaining pockets of opposition that existed 
within the state. In Bolivia, the insurgent movement again won a majority 
in the assembly, but here an opposition attempted to leverage institutions 
external to the assembly in order to force the majority to compromise. The 
result, particularly in an environment of high mass mobilization, was a 
chaotic struggle that nearly caused the breakdown of the state (although in 
the end, the parties reached a negotiated solution that probably reduced 
tensions). 
A. Venezuela (1999) 
Venezuela had, since 1958, been a pacted, two-party “partyarchy,” 
where two strong parties, Acción Democrática (AD) and Comité de 
Organización Politica Electoral Independiente (COPEI), competed for 
power.57 The system was competitive between these two parties but tended 
to restrict competition by any outside groups.58 The two parties maintained 
 
57. See, e.g., STEVE ELLNER, RETHINKING VENEZUELAN POLITICS: CLASS, CONFLICT, AND THE 
CHÁVEZ PHENOMENON 51–87 (2008); Michael Coppedge, Venezuela  Popular Sovereignty Versus 
Liberal Democracy, in CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN LATIN AMERICA 165 (Jorge I. 
Domínguez & Michael Shifter eds., 2d ed. 2003). 
58. See, e.g., ELLNER, supra note 57, at 53–55 (explaining how the “pacted” democracies in 
Venezuela and Colombia tended to exclude other movements, especially on the left). 
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their grip on power by being strongly linked to economic and social 
organizations like business associations and trade unions.59 They also doled 
out patronage funds due to their grip on oil money.60 But by the early 
1990s, this system was in disarray due to a series of corruption scandals 
and economic crises, and the two parties had weakened considerably.61 
Hugo Chávez, who began his political career with an unsuccessful coup 
attempt against the old regime in 1992, took power in 1998 vowing to 
dismantle the old system.62 He was able to take advantage of the 
population’s near-universal desire for substantial changes to the political 
order.63 
As explained in more detail below, Chávez was able to use his total 
control over the constitution-making process in 1999 to construct a 
competitive authoritarian regime, where elections continue to be held, but 
where Chávez’s political movement has systematic advantages over the 
opposition (although he does not always win).64 The puzzling aspect of 
Chávez’s use of constitution-making, and of the role of constitution-
making in competitive authoritarian regimes more generally, stems from 
Levitsky and Way’s observation that these regimes tend to look, on paper, 
much like normal democracies—the advantages that they give to quasi-
authoritarian incumbents derive from informal institutions and practices 
like bribery and ballot-stuffing.65 
The text of the constitution was not irrelevant in the Venezuelan case: 
it did increase presidential power along a number of dimensions. Most 
 
59. See Coppedge, supra note 57, at 172 (stating that AD and COPEI were “broadly 
representative of society” and “extended their control to non-party organizations that they had 
politicized”). 
60. See TERRY LYNN KARL, THE PARADOX OF PLENTY: OIL BOOMS AND PETRO STATES 92–115 
(1997) (explaining how the two-party regime built support using oil money). 
61. See Coppedge, supra note 57, at 171–75; KARL, supra note 60, at 161–85. 
62. See ELLNER, supra note 57, at 95–99 (explaining the background of the coup attempt); id. at 
109–12 (explaining the ideology of the early part of Chávez’s presidency, which focused on carrying 
out political change to the old system). 
63. See, e.g., id. at 111. 
64. Levitsky and Way define a competitive authoritarian regime as a “civilian regime[] in which 
formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but 
in which incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their 
opponents.” LEVITSKY & WAY, supra note 51, at 5. Regimes like the one in Venezuela, which lie 
somewhere between consolidated democracies and full-fledged authoritarian regimes, are inherently 
difficult to classify. Myers, for example, questions whether the Venezuelan regime should be 
considered a “delegative democracy”—a democratic regime with relatively fair elections but no real 
checks on presidential power—or an “electoral autocracy”—where some electoral competition is 
allowed but with a very unequal playing field. David J. Myers, Venezuela  Delegative Democracy or 
Electoral Autocracy?, in CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN LATIN AMERICA 285, 292–93 
(Jorge I. Domínguez & Michael Shifter eds., 3d ed. 2008). 
65. See, e.g., LEVITSKY & WAY, supra note 51, at 27–28 (noting the “centrality of informal 
institutions,” such as vote-buying, electoral fraud, organized corruption, and privatized violence to 
competitive authoritarian regimes). 
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importantly, the old constitution would have limited Chávez to a single 
term in office, while the new one allowed him to run for two additional 
terms.66 But the most striking fact about the Venezuelan process is that the 
assembly spent very little time debating the text and in fact wrote it in 
about three months. Most of its labor was spent instead on shutting down 
and packing other institutions like the legislature, judiciary, departmental 
and local councils, and labor unions. Members of the old AD and COPEI 
parties continued to dominate all of these bodies—certainly enough to 
block much of Chávez’s agenda.67 Thus Chávez, who had initially won the 
election in 1998 with 56% of the vote,68 was able to clean out the 
opposition, which made it much easier for him to consolidate power. The 
key role of the assembly, then, was not in writing a new text but in 
establishing total power over other institutions of state. 
1. Process 
In Venezuela, there were no effective constraints on Chávez’s 
movement. Chávez was able to unilaterally write the electoral rules that 
would govern the Assembly, and he selected a set of rules that brilliantly 
maximized his electoral representation and completely marginalized the 
opposition. Chávez’s movement won only 60% of the vote but took 95% of 
the seats, leaving the opposition with basically no voice.69 Rather than 
using a proportional representation system that would have mapped votes 
 
66. See CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, 1999 art. 230. Members 
of the constituent assembly, of course, recognized the significance of this provision and wanted to 
ensure that Chávez would receive two additional terms. See Gaceta Constituyente (Diario de Debates), 
Noviember 1999–Enero 2000, No. 36, Nov. 4, 1999 (noting the understanding of an assembly member 
that Chávez’s two terms will run from the date on which the new constitution is enacted). There are 
other provisions that have emerged as problematic for democracy: for example, the clause that allows 
the assembly to delegate broad swaths of power to the executive. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 64, at 291 
(recounting Chávez’s efforts to make full use of these powers following the 2007 election). But such 
clauses are not highly unusual in consolidated democracies. 
67. These parties maintained a strong presence in the Congress even after the 1998 election. AD 
and COPEI together held 89 of the 188 seats in the lower house, and 46 of 100 seats in the Senate. 
When coupled with other parties that were friendly offshoots of these parties or otherwise opposed to 
Chávez, they held well more than 50% of both chambers, certainly enough to block much of Chávez’s 
agenda. Moreover, the judiciary was dominated by members of the two traditional parties, and 
Venezuela had long been a federal country, with many of the regional and departmental councils, 
governors, and mayors still in the hands of AD or COPEI leaders. Finally, AD and COPEI still 
controlled the major labor unions and business organizations, which had the potential to wreck 
economic havoc on the country. See Coppedge, supra note 57, at 179 tbl.8.5. 
68. See id. at 174–75. 
69. I do not mean to imply that the pro-Chávez forces were fully homogenous; as Ellner notes, 
there were “hard-line” and “soft-line” factions within his movement. See ELLNER, supra note 57, at 
139–73; see also ROBERTO VICIANO PASTOR & RUBEN MARTINEZ DALMAU, CAMBIO POLÍTICO Y 
PROCESO CONSTITUYENTE EN VENEZUELA, 1998–2000 [POLITICAL CHANGE AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROCESS IN VENEZUELA, 1998–2000] 161 (2001). This suggests that heterogeneity in a political 
movement is not a bar to an authoritarian or quasi-authoritarian outcome. 
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directly onto seats, Chávez used a majoritarian system with single-member 
districts, which tends to over-represent forces with majority support 
nationally.70 The opposition was highly disorganized, often running no 
candidates for a given seat or running multiple candidates, thus splintering 
votes and compounding the effects of the majoritarian electoral system.71 
Further, observers considered the debates to have been highly 
participatory. The referendum to convoke an assembly (which passed with 
more than 80% of votes in the affirmative), the elections for the Assembly, 
and the referendum approving the final text of the constitution (which 
passed with 72% of votes in the affirmative) all had high voter turnout 
compared to the turnout towards the end of the crumbling two-party 
system.72 Moreover, during the assembly itself, the commissions received, 
considered, and in many cases incorporated changes proposed by civil 
society groups. As García-Guadilla notes, many civil society groups saw an 
opening due to the “loss of legitimacy by the traditional political parties,” 
and thus participated enthusiastically in and around the assembly, both by 
submitting proposals and by holding seminars, workshops, and other events 
aimed at debating proposals.73 They also had some success at actually 
getting proposals accepted: García-Guadilla reports that these organizations 
submitted 624 proposals and had more than 50% accepted for inclusion in 
the constitutional text.74 Further, groups stated that they were generally 
satisfied with the outcome, especially the more participatory model of 
democracy.75 At the same time, however, Chávez’s influence on the 
constitution was overpowering—the final version closely resembled his 
initial proposal on most major points. Thus, civil society influence may 
have affected the details of the constitution but did not greatly shape its 
major structural outlines.76 
 
70. For a detailed discussion, see Renata Segura & Ana María Bejarano, ¡Ni una asamblea más 
sin nosotros! Exclusion, Inclusion, and the Politics of Constitution-Making in the Andes, 11 
CONSTELLATIONS 217, 225, 228–30 (2004). 
71. The two traditional parties won zero seats in the Assembly; the elected members of the 
opposition were basically independents. See Coppedge, supra note 57, at 179 tbl.8.5. 
72. See id. at 178–79. 
73. María Pilar García-Guadilla, Civil Society  Institutionalization, Fragmentation, Autonomy, in 
VENEZUELAN POLITICS IN THE CHÁVEZ ERA: CLASS, POLARIZATION, & CONFLICT 179, 186 (Steve 
Ellner & Daniel Hellinger eds., 2003). 
74. See id. 
75. See id. (“Many of the organizations relegated to a low level of success indicated that 
nevertheless they were satisfied with the results obtained.”). 
76. Viciano Pastor and Martinez Dalmau give some examples of debates that were heavily 
influenced by civil society. They note that the debate over the regulation of abortion was heavily 
influenced by both women’s groups and church organizations, and that the final text—which took a 
vague position on the legalization of abortion—was a result of victory by women’s organizations. Also, 
they note that civil society groups helped broaden the right to information. These influences on the text 
were obviously not unimportant but did not go to the basic structure of the state or to other fundamental 
issues. See PASTOR & DALMAU, supra note 69, at 167–69. 
         
2013] Constitution-Making Gone Wrong 943 
Since the Venezuelan assembly did not represent the opposition, and 
since mass participation was more window-dressing than real influence, the 
only prospects for effective control over the assembly came from external 
institutions. The Venezuelan Supreme Court attempted to use a complex set 
of doctrines to place limits on the assembly’s actions, but these efforts 
failed. The vague nature of the doctrines, and more importantly the difficult 
political environment for the Court, made it impossible for it to effectively 
take a stand against the assembly’s actions. The result is that the assembly 
was given free rein to dismantle other state institutions. 
These attempts originated in a debate about whether a constituent 
assembly could be called by Chávez in the first place. The text of the 
constitution only contemplated constitutional amendment by the Congress 
and did not explicitly mention the possibility of a constituent assembly. A 
group of citizens asked the Political–Administrative Chamber of the 
Supreme Court to rule on whether Chávez could legally hold a referendum 
on whether to call elections for a constituent assembly within the existing 
legal order.77 The Court, acting under considerable political pressure, held 
that the referendum could go ahead.78 It distinguished between the 
“constituted” and “original constituent” powers, and defined the latter as 
“the primogenial power of the political community to give itself a judicial 
and constitutional organization.”79 This fundamental organizational power 
could not be confused with the amendment power that was found textually 
in the constitution, because the “original constituent power” is “prior and 
superior to the established judicial regime.”80 Thus, the Court held that the 
public retained an inherent power to affect fundamental constitutional 
change, regardless of limitations in the constitutional text.81 
But the Court also attempted to place limits on this power. Opponents 
brought a subsequent challenge against the referendum questions Chávez 
had formulated.82 The first question asked whether the voter wanted to 
convoke a National Constituent Assembly “with the aim of transforming 
the state and creating a new legal order that will permit the effective 
functioning of a social and participatory democracy.”83 A second question 
asked whether the voter “authorized the President of the Republic 
to . . . fix . . . the bases of the electoral procedure in which the National 
 
77. See Caso  Junta Directiva de la Fundacion para los Derecrios Humanos (Supreme Court of 
Justice, Political–Administrative Chamber), REVISTA DEL DERECHO PUBLICO, nos. 77–80, 1999, at 56. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 65. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. See Caso  Gerardo Blyde, contra la Resolucion No. 990217–32 (Supreme Court of Justice, 
Political–Administrative Chamber), REVISTA DEL DERECHO PUBLICO, nos. 77–80, 1999, at 73. 
83. Id. at 78. 
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Constituent Assembly will be elected.”84 Here, the Political– 
Administrative Chamber altered its jurisprudence, noting that “it is the 
existing constitution that permits [preservation of] the state of law and the 
[proceedings] of the National Constituent Assembly” and therefore that the 
Assembly was bound by the basic principles of the existing constitution.85 
Chief among these principles was the idea that the Assembly must 
represent “the true popular will.”86 The Court held that the second question 
violated this principle and related ideas about “popular participation,” 
essentially because it forced voters to vote on an electoral procedure before 
the details of the procedure were established.87 The vagueness of this initial 
ruling forced the court to issue a clarification explaining that the Assembly 
was “bound to the spirit of the Constitution in force, and therefore is 
limited by the fundamental principles of the Democratic State of Law.”88 
With this opinion the Court wanted to establish some controls over the 
Assembly, perhaps in light of a concern that it would prove manipulable by 
Chávez. But the Court had great difficulty articulating principles that would 
limit him, and the constraints actually chosen were ineffectual: they forced 
Chávez to articulate the method of election for the Assembly before the 
referendum, which he did in a separate document alluded to in the 
referendum questions.89 However, it did not force him to share authority in 
drafting the electoral rules or to adhere to particular substantive principles 
in doing so. Thus, as noted above, he was able to draft the rules unilaterally 
in a way that maximized support for his movement.90 
Subsequent cases refined the principles set out in the initial decision 
but were no more effective in establishing any actual control. A subsequent 
case struck down a phrase included in the electoral rules that Chávez wrote, 
which defined the Assembly “as an original power that carries popular 
sovereignty.”91 The Political–Administrative Chamber held that the phrase 
was in “frank contradiction” with the principle that the Assembly would be 
bound by the spirit and fundamental principles of the existing 
constitution.92 And in yet another “interpretive” case the Chamber took 
 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 80. 
86. Id. (“Stated in other words, one is attempting to obtain the clearest possible popular 
expression, the closest reflection to the will of the majorities, which doubtlessly implies the definition 
of those aspects related to the Assembly regime that is attempting to be installed.”). 
87. Id. at 80–81. 
88. Caso  Gerardo Blyde Perez, Clarification (Supreme Court of Justice, Political–
Administrative Chamber), REVISTA DEL DERECHO PUBLICO, nos. 77–80, 1999, at 84. 
89. See PASTOR & DALMAU, supra note 69, at 130–31. 
90. See supra text accompanying note 69. 
91. See Caso  Gerardo Blyde vs. Consejo Supremo Electoral (Supreme Court of Justice, 
Political–Administrative Chamber), REVISTA DEL DERECHO PUBLICO, nos. 77–80, 1999, at 85, 88. 
92. Id. at 90. 
         
2013] Constitution-Making Gone Wrong 945 
note of statements President Chávez was making on television and radio, 
where he stated that the elections to the Assembly could not be controlled 
by the electoral laws currently in force because “the elections of the 
Constituent Assembly are not by mandate of the Constitution or of any law, 
they are by mandate of you, the people . . . .”93 The Chamber stated that 
Chávez’s statements were incorrect because the elections of the Constituent 
Assembly would be carried out within the existing legal system, and thus 
were governed by “the entire current legal order . . . , the electoral rules 
approved by referendum . . . , the Constitution of the Republic, the Organic 
Law of Suffrage and Political Participation, and the other electoral 
norms . . . .”94 The Court, however, while repeatedly reiterating these ideas, 
did not actually use its doctrine to mold the Assembly’s electoral 
procedures or other rules to any practical effect.95 
Once the Assembly had been convoked, Chávez ignored the rulings of 
the Chamber and immediately declared it to have “original” powers. He 
stated in his opening address that the Assembly was “most sovereign” 
(“soberanisima”) and, in a symbolic political maneuver, immediately 
placed his own hold on the presidency at the disposition of the Assembly, 
stating that he served at its pleasure and would be forced to surrender the 
office if the Assembly so voted.96 The somewhat bewildered members of 
 
93. See Caso  Alberto Franceschi y Otros (Supreme Court of Justice, Political–Administrative 
Chamber), REVISTA DEL DERECHO PUBLICO, nos. 77–80, 1999, at 104, 104–106. Chávez was 
responding defiantly to an order of the National Electoral Council to desist from certain forms of 
television advertising that were considered illegal during political campaigns, arguing that the Council 
had no authority to regulate his actions. See id. at 105–06. 
94. Id. at 109–10 (“The novelty—and, for this, extraordinary aspect—of the actual Venezuelan 
constituent assembly process is that it did not come about as a result of an event of fact (civil war, coup, 
revolution, etc.) but, on the contrary, was conceived as a ‘legal Constituent Process;’ in other words, a 
process marked within the actual Venezuelan judicial system.”). 
95. For example, cases held that the electoral rules themselves, once approved by the people in 
the initial referendum, possessed “supreme validity.” The Political–Administrative Chamber therefore 
refused to strike down a provision of the rules that called for a “personalized” (or non-party list) method 
of election for the assembly, on the grounds that it would violate the right of suffrage of the substantial 
illiterate population of the country. See Caso  Cecilia Maria Colon de Gonzalez (Supreme Court of 
Justice, Political–Administrative Chamber), REVISTA DEL DERECHO PUBLICO, nos. 77–80, 1999, at 90, 
90–91. The petitioners reasoned that the requirement of “personalized” elections, in which a candidate 
would be identified only by name instead of by party symbol, would make it impossible for illiterate 
adults to cast a valid vote. See id. at 92. But the Court held that the claim was “inadmissible” now that 
the rules had been approved in referendum because they were a “decision of the electoral body, in 
exercise of its constituent power.” Id. And in a closely related case, the Court applied the electoral rules 
directly in striking down proposed regulations of the National Electoral Council that would have 
allowed the use of symbols in elections, holding that the Council was required to comply with the 
“personaliz[ed vote]” requirement in those rules. See Caso  Antonio Ramon Astudillo y otros (Supreme 
Court of Justice, Political–Administrative Chamber), REVISTA DEL DERECHO PUBLICO, nos. 77–80, 
1999, at 93, 101. Thus, the Chamber was unable to take a consistent position on whether it would use 
constitutional values and principles to control every phase of the Assembly process. 
96. See HUGO CHÁVEZ FRÍAS, DOCUMENTOS FUNDAMENTALES DE LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA 
DE VENEZUELA 7–61 (1999) (containing Chávez’s speech at the opening of the Assembly, where he 
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the Assembly debated the issue on August 9th and ratified Chávez as 
President with zero no votes and three abstentions;97 he was resworn as 
President in front of the Assembly on August 11th, where he stated that 
“this act of today has that profound significance, that there remains no 
doubt to anyone that the Constituent Assembly is original and that all of the 
constituted powers will have to subordinate themselves not only to the 
word but to the concrete fact, before the sovereign mandates that emanate 
from here, before this center of light.”98 The idea that the Assembly 
exercised original power was echoed by the elected president of the 
Assembly (who was part of Chávez’s party), Luis Miquilena, who, in his 
speech accepting the charge, declared the “original” and “sovereign” 
character of the Assembly.99 The Assembly’s statute also stated that it 
“could limit or decide the cessation of the activities of the authorities that 
made up the public power.”100 
Chávez’s maneuver was much more than symbolic: it was designed to 
enable him to weaken competing institutions over which his movement had 
less influence. On August 12th, the day after Chávez took the oath of office 
in front of the Assembly, the Assembly considered and approved a 
“national declaration of emergency,” “declaring the reorganization of all 
the organs of Public Power” and authorizing the Assembly to “take, 
execute, and order the measures dealing with the competence of the public 
powers of the State . . . that are necessary and indispensable to overcome 
the situation of emergency confronting the Nation . . . .”101 The Assembly 
moved first against the judiciary—establishing on August 19th a committee 
of nine members selected by the Assembly and granting that body 
sweeping power to suspend or remove members of any court within the 
system, to select new judges, and to reorganize the structure of the 
judiciary.102 The president of the Assembly noted that the Supreme Court 
 
referred to the Assembly repeatedly as “soberanisisimo”); Gaceta Constituyente (Diario de Debates), 
Agosto–Septiembre 1999, No. 5, Aug. 9, 1999 [hereinafter Gaceta Constituyente, No. 5]. 
97. See Gaceta Constituyente, No. 5, supra note 96. 
98. Gaceta Constituyente (Diario de Debates), Agosto–Septiembre 1999, No. 6, Aug. 11, 1999. 
99. Gaceta Constituyente (Diario de Debates), Agosto–Septiembre 1999, No. 1, Aug. 3, 1999, at 
2. Miquilena also stated that, “Our enemies continue being blinded, they try now to take refuge in a 
rejected judicial methodology that would take power away from the Constituent Assembly, that would 
try to make the Assembly a simple instrument to make a new constitution; in other words, they try to 
present to the country an insufficient Constituent Assembly, that would be incapable of having the 
sufficient sovereignty; the sacred cows of law are trying to invent the idea that this is a secondary and 
not original Constituent Assembly.” Id. 
100. See Gaceta Constituyente (Diario de Debates), Agosto–Septiembre 1999, No. 4, Aug. 7, 
1999. 
101. Gaceta Constituyente (Diario de Debates), Agosto–Septiembre 1999, No. 7, Aug. 12, 1999 
(considering the decree to reorganize the public powers). 
102. Gaceta Constituyente (Diario de Debates), Agosto–Septiembre 1999, No. 8, Aug. 17, 1999. 
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itself would be completely eliminated if it interfered with the 
Commission’s work.103 
When the Congress called itself into emergency session and began 
debating the appropriateness of those measures, the Assembly sharply 
limited the powers of Congress as well and discussed dissolving the 
Congress entirely.104 It issued a decree suspending the functioning of the 
plenaries of the House and Senate and reducing Congress down to its 
Delegated Commission (which normally stayed in session during 
congressional recesses) and several other Committees.105 It also approved a 
short list of activities that the Congress was allowed to work on, established 
that some of these actions were subject to ratification by the Assembly,106 
placed all other legislative powers in the Assembly itself, and established a 
Commission of Investigation charged with auditing the budgetary and other 
operations of the Congress.107 Finally, the resolution similarly reduced all 
state legislative assemblies down to designated commissions composed of 
no more than seven members and decreed a list of matters on which even 
town councils were forbidden to take any action until further notice.108 A 
subsequent resolution enacted August 30th reformed the first resolution by 
establishing that the Assembly itself would take over and constitute the 
Delegated Commission and other remaining commissions of Congress if 
the remaining congressional members failed to carry out their functions.109 
These measures were challenged in front of the full Supreme Court by 
the leadership in the Congress, and this time the Court abandoned its efforts 
to control the Assembly.110 The Court stated that the National Constituent 
Assembly is “not a derivative power” and thus “cannot be subject to the 
 
103. See Gaceta Constituyente (Diario de Debates), Agosto–Septiembre 1999, No. 9, Aug. 19, 
1999 (“Everything opposed to the decisions of the Constituent Commission will be eliminated. If the 
Supreme Court of Justice takes any measure—and it is likely that they will based on the tone with 
which they have been responding to some of our proposals—that in any way clashes with the decisions 
of the Commission, you are assured that by a unanimous vote their won’t be anybody here who will 
hesitate in eliminating the Supreme Court of Justice.”). 
104. See Gaceta Constituyente (Diario de Debates), Agosto–Septiembre 1999, No. 11, Aug. 25, 
1999; see also PASTOR & DALMAU, supra note 69, at 150–51. 
105. See PASTOR & DALMAU, supra note 69, at 150–51. 
106. For example, the Commission was only empowered to pass legislation dealing with taxes, 
the budget, and telecommunications and issue extraordinary financial powers to the president after 
receiving the approval of the Assembly. See id. at 153 n.394. 
107. See id. at 152. 
108. See id. at 153. 
109. See Gaceta Constituyente (Diario de Debates), Agosto–Septiembre 1999, No. 14, Aug. 30, 
1999. 
110. See Caso  Vicepresidente del Congreso de la República vs. Asamblea (decreto 25-8-99) 
(Supreme Court of Justice, Plenary Chamber), REVISTA DEL DERECHO PUBLICO, nos. 77–80, 1999, at 
111. 
         
948 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 64:5:923 
limits of the existing judicial order, including the current Constitution.”111 
It also noted that the “convoking of the Colombian Constituent Assembly 
was preceded by a very broad consensus, in whose formation intervened 
the President of the Republic and the principal political forces, pushed by 
the initiatives of civil society.”112 
This decision allowed the Assembly to take a series of actions that 
reshaped the entire state; in essence, the Court signed its own death 
warrant. The Commission charged with evaluating the entire judiciary 
removed a large number of judges and appointed their replacements.113 The 
Congress, which had been effectively dissolved in August, was formally 
dissolved in December and was replaced by a National Legislative 
Commission chosen by the Constituent Assembly.114 State legislative 
assemblies were likewise dissolved and replaced by five member 
commissions chosen by the Assembly.115 Municipal councils and mayors 
were left intact but placed “under the supervision” of the Assembly and the 
National Legislative Commission, which was empowered to replace any of 
the current assemblymen or mayors at will.116 The Supreme Court was 
replaced by a new Supreme Tribunal of Justice, which was staffed with a 
group of magistrates chosen by the Assembly.117 Finally, the Assembly 
selected a new National Ombudsman (or Defensor del Pueblo) and Chief 
Prosecutor and chose new members of the National Electoral Council.118 
The Assembly also removed hostile mayors and created a National 
Commission of Unions that was charged with purging the leadership of the 
country’s labor unions, which was notoriously interlinked with the two 
traditional parties, AD and COPEI.119 
Thus, the judiciary’s attempts to place limits on the Assembly failed. It 
is difficult to see how it could have succeeded. The courts could not have 
 
111. Id. at 119. The Court oddly held, however, that the Supreme Court still possessed the power 
to adjudicate controversies between organs of state, including the Constituent Assembly. See id. 
112. Id. The dissenters, mostly from the Political–Administrative Chamber of the Court, sought to 
reiterate the Chamber’s doctrine that the Assembly was subject to constraints from the existing political 
order. See id. at 120–32 (dissenting opinions of Magistrates Harting, Rondon de Sanso, Ramirez 
Landaeta, Grisanti Luciani, and La Roche). 
113. See, e.g., Brewer-Carías, supra note 53, at 177–83. 
114.  Gaceta Constituyente (Diario de Debates), Noviember 1999–Enero 2000, No. 51, Dec. 22, 
1999, at 3–4. 
115. See id. at 4. 
116. See id. 
117. See id. at 4–5. 
118. See id. at 6–7. 
119. See Gaceta Constituyente (Diario de Debates), Noviember 1999–Enero 2000, No. 62, Jan. 
30, 1999, at 6 (approving a decree to intervene in union elections); see also Steve Ellner, Organized 
Labor and the Challenge of Chavismo, in VENEZUELAN POLITICS IN THE CHÁVEZ ERA, supra note 73, 
at 161, 168–70 (explaining how the soft-liners within Chávez’s movement won an internal battle to try 
and alter the nature of existing unions rather than dissolving them and creating entirely new 
movements). 
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shut down the process entirely—the popular outcry for a new constitution 
was too great. But once they abandoned the formal limits in the 
constitutional text, they were left with a vague doctrine that was difficult to 
enforce. More importantly, the political environment made it almost 
impossible for the courts to oppose Chávez. The Supreme Court was a 
highly unpopular institution because of its link to the corruption of the old 
regime and both Chávez and the Assembly used rhetoric that tended to 
delegitimize the judiciary to great effect.120 
2. Outcome 
The lack of any effective constraint on Chávez during the Assembly 
allowed him to take control of the entire state and this in turn helped him 
construct a competitive authoritarian regime. The constitutional text is not 
really a “blueprint” for authoritarianism, although it does strengthen 
presidential power.121 The problems instead have been the failure to carry 
out constitutional norms and informal practices that undermine democracy. 
For example, Chávez has relied upon “transitional” appointments to the 
judiciary to avoid the merit-based, careerist system found in the text.122 
These transitional judges lack security of tenure, making them removable at 
will by Chávez.123 Moreover, Chávez’s measures aimed at stacking the 
deck in elections and at other times have generally gone unchecked because 
the members of the Supreme Court are closely affiliated with his regime.124 
B. Bolivia (2006–2009) 
In Bolivia, as in Venezuela, a new constitution was written just after a 
pacted, consensus-based political system had broken down. Between the 
1980s and 2005, Bolivia was ruled by coalitions of parties who held their 
pacts together with patronage and pursued a broadly neoliberal agenda.125 
 
120. ALLAN R. BREWER-CARÍAS, DISMANTLING DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA: THE CHÁVEZ 
EXPERIMENT 177–79 (2010). 
121. But see Brewer-Carías, supra note 53, at 505, 518–22 (arguing that the text created a more 
centralized government and stronger president, which undermined democracy). 
122. See, e.g., Angel E. Alvarez, State Reform Before and After Chávez’s Election, in 
VENEZUELAN POLITICS IN THE CHÁVEZ ERA, supra note 73, at 147, 158–59. 
123. See, e.g., id. 
124. For example, the Supreme Court has often used doctrines suggesting that the constitutional 
regime has remained in a state of “transition” in order to allow actions like temporary judicial 
appointments that are not in accord with the new text. See, e.g., id.; see also BREWER-CARÍAS, supra 
note 120, at 226–44 (lamenting the lack of judicial independence of the new Supreme Tribunal of 
Justice). 
125. See generally Eduardo A. Gamarra, Bolivia  Evo Morales and Democracy, in 
CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 64, at 124, 125–30. See 
also René Antonio Mayorga, Bolivia’s Democracy at the Crossroads, in THE THIRD WAVE OF 
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These parties were initially effective at providing stable growth but over 
time became increasingly plagued by corruption and increasingly incapable 
of carrying out fundamental reforms.126 Like Chávez, President Morales 
rose to power at the head of a political movement, Movimiento al 
Socialismo (MAS), which promised to clean out these parties.127 His 
movement also stood for strong opposition to neoliberal ideas like 
privatization and had a very different demographic background from the 
traditional parties.128 For example, MAS has held itself out as representing 
the very large percentage of the population that identifies as indigenous, 
which felt marginalized from the mainstream political parties. The party 
thus offered the promise of new social inclusion.129 One major difference 
between the Venezuelan and Bolivian case is that, in Venezuela, Chávez 
dominated his own personalist movement, and thus his party has had little 
autonomy. In Bolivia, in contrast, Morales is merely an important figure 
within a much more programmatic and powerful organization.130 
Another major difference is that MAS faced an organized rather than 
inchoate opposition. In particular, Morales faced well-organized opposition 
from four departments located in the east of the country, together called the 
“half moon” because of their crescent shape.131 These departments, 
centered on the city and department of Santa Cruz, are the economic engine 
of the country and the source of many of its natural resources like natural 
gas.132 Further, they tend to have very different demographics from the 
mountainous departments near the capital of La Paz: they are relatively 
wealthy for Bolivia and considerably less indigenous.133 Majorities in these 
provinces openly opposed Morales from the moment of his election; their 
 
DEMOCRATIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA: ADVANCES AND SETBACKS 149, 151–63 (Frances Hagopian & 
Scott P. Mainwaring eds., 2005) (explaining the nature of this regime). 
126. See Gamarra, supra note 125, at 127 (stating that these parties “had suffered an enormous 
erosion of their appeal” because of a perception that they were “corrupt” and had sold off their 
resources, as well as “deepen[ed] inequality”); Mayorga, supra note 125, at 163–67. 
127. See Gamarra, supra note 125, at 127. 
128. Mayorga, supra note 125, at 175–76. 
129. Figures differ as to the size of the indigenous population of Bolivia; the issue is 
sociologically complex. Donna Lee Van Cott estimates that about 65% of the population self-identifies 
as indigenous. See Donna Lee Van Cott, Issues for Policymakers, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND 
DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 1, 15 (Donna Lee Van Cott ed., 1994). But see Gamarra, supra note 
125, at 132–33 (noting that studies have disagreed and the true figure may be closer to 10%–20%). 
130. See, e.g., Santiago Anria, Bolivia’s MAS  Between Party and Movement, in LATIN 
AMERICA’S LEFT TURNS: POLITICS, POLICIES & TRAJECTORIES OF CHANGE 101, 112–13, 121–22 
(Maxwell A. Cameron & Eric Hershberg eds., 2010) [hereinafter LATIN AMERICA’S LEFT TURNS]. 
131. See Maxwell A. Cameron & Kenneth E. Sharpe, Andean Left Turns  Constituent Power and 
Constitution Making, in LATIN AMERICA’S LEFT TURNS, supra note 130, at 61, 71 (noting that the 
opposition had “material resources, institutional leverage, and electoral appeal”). Cameron and Sharpe 
also argue that Morales exists in a very different political culture than Chávez, which has made him 
more likely to respect the democratic rules of the game. See id. at 74. 
132. See id. 
133. See id. at 71. 
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chief demand was for greater regional autonomy and control over their own 
resources and other wealth.134 
Morales took power demanding the holding of a constituent assembly 
in order to “refound” Bolivian democracy on a more socially inclusive 
basis.135 This was an idea that was broadly supported by various political 
actors for different reasons.136 Going back to 2003, most Bolivians had 
become convinced that a constituent assembly was necessary to solve the 
country’s problems.137 In principle, the opposition around Santa Cruz 
supported the idea as well, because they saw it as a way to obtain greater 
regional autonomy.138 The difficult question is whether there was any 
possibility of finding a constitution that would have succeeded in assuaging 
all of these various visions. The likely answer seems to be yes—while there 
were important differences between the groups, they all favored or 
accepted certain broad principles, like increasing the level of autonomy of 
the departments, allowing more expression and inclusion of indigenous 
communities, and reforming the land tenure system.139 
1. Process 
That it was almost impossible for such a compromise to emerge was 
due in large part to the details of the constitutional process, which can 
properly be described as “messy and irregular”140 and which very nearly 
became a full-fledged “constitutional breakdown.”141 First, as we will see, 
internal to the Assembly MAS and related parties won a substantial 
majority of seats—the opposition was placed in a weak position although it 
was not completely marginalized as in Venezuela. The opposition tried to 
make up for this deficiency by using other institutions—the Congress and 
the courts, particularly—to assert substantial oversight over the Assembly. 
Finally, levels of participation were extraordinarily high—the public on 
both sides was deeply invested in the event, and thus both sides were able 
 
134. The region of Santa Cruz had already, in 2005, passed a regional referendum by a large 
margin calling for greater autonomy. Kent Eaton, Backlash in Bolivia  Regional Autonomy as a 
Reaction Against Indigenous Mobilization, 35 POL. & SOC’Y 71, 84 (2007). 
135. See Gamarra, supra note 125, at 129. 
136. See id. at 139 (finding in focus groups that citizens had “high expectations” for the 
Assembly’s success). 
137. See id. at 138. 
138. See id. (noting that members of the half-moon departments “hoped that a constituent 
assembly would end the debate about centralization and its alleged limit on the development of the 
country’s key regions”). 
139. See, e.g., Franz Xavier Barrios Suvelza, Autonomías Indígenas, in CONTRAPUNTOS AL 
DEBATE CONSTITUYENTE 69 (Horst Grebe Lopez et al., 2007) (describing points of coincidence on the 
issue of how to treat indigenous communities). 
140. Cameron & Sharpe, supra note 131, at 73. 
141. Fabrice Lehoucq, Bolivia’s Constitutional Breakdown, 19 J. DEMOCRACY 110 (2008). 
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to muster large groupings of citizens for marches or demonstrations. The 
combination of all this, as we will see below, was a recipe for an extremely 
chaotic process. In the absence of any fixed rules of the game, the external 
limits on the Assembly proved highly contested, and the further ability of 
both sides to mobilize their publics exacerbated social and regional divides 
during the Assembly. But in the end, the external limits on the Assembly 
did hold, and the final constitution was negotiated between MAS and the 
opposition rather than being imposed as in Venezuela. 
The previous president, under pressure from MAS, had in 2004 pushed 
through Congress a constitutional amendment allowing the convoking of a 
constituent assembly.142 Thus, unlike in Venezuela, in Bolivia the holding 
of an assembly was explicitly contemplated and regulated by the old 
constitution. The provision stated that the “total reform” of the constitution 
would be the power of a constituent assembly, which would be convoked 
by a “special law” approved by two-thirds of the members of the Congress, 
and which could not be vetoed by the president.143 This simple provision 
placed significant constraints on Morales, because it ruled out a strategy of 
making an end-run around Congress, as Chávez had done, and forced him 
to negotiate with the opposition in Congress.144 The opposition generally 
shared Morales’s desire for a new constitution, but were concerned that he 
would dominate the process and ignore their concern for greater regional 
autonomy.145 
The two sides successfully negotiated and approved, in March 2006, a 
special law to convoke the Assembly, which placed significant external 
constraints on the process.146 First, the electoral rules were designed to 
ensure substantial representation for minority political forces—they were 
far less majoritarian than Chávez’s electoral rules had been in Venezuela.147 
 
142. See Ley No. 2631, Feb. 20, 2004, available at http://www.lexivox.org/norms/BO-L-
2631.xhtml. 
143. See id. art. 232 (“The total reform of the Constitution is a private power of the Constitutional 
Assembly, which will be convoked by a Special Law of convocation approved by two-thirds of the vote 
of the members present in the national Congress and cannot be vetoed by the President of the 
Republic.”). 
144. Morales held 72 of 130 seats in the House but only 12 of 27 seats in the Senate. See JEFFERY 
R. WEBBER, FROM REBELLION TO REFORM IN BOLIVIA: CLASS STRUGGLE, INDIGENOUS LIBERATION, 
AND THE POLITICS OF EVO MORALES 55 tbl.2.3. 
145. See, e.g., Podemos y MNR acusan a MAS de querer hegemonizar la Asamblea, LOS 
TIEMPOS, Mar. 18, 2006, available at http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/actualidad/nacional/20060318/ 
podemos-y-mnr-acusan-a-mas-de-querer-hegemonizar-la_5745_5745.html (noting the opposition’s fear 
that Morales’s movements would find ways to dominate the elections to the assembly). 
146. See Ley 3364, Mar. 6, 2006, available at http://www.lexivox.org/norms/BO-L-3364.xhtml. 
147. Two hundred ten of the 255 members were selected in 70 local districts with a district 
magnitude of three. Two seats would go to the movement receiving the plurality of votes, and one 
would go to the second-place movement or party. See id. art. 14. The remaining 45 members were 
selected at the departmental level, with each department receiving five members, regardless of the size 
of that department. See id. Further, the parties and movements were allowed to form alliances at the 
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Second, the rules proposed that the constitution would be drafted in the city 
of Sucre, which was considered a relatively neutral site between Morales 
supporters in La Paz and opposition supporters in Santa Cruz.148 Third, the 
law provided that the Assembly “will approve the text of the new 
constitution with two-thirds of the members present,” and that once so 
approved the text would be put to the people in a referendum convoked by 
the executive, which would require approval by an absolute majority of 
votes.149 Finally, the Assembly was given one year in which to complete its 
task.150 In mid-2007, when the Assembly was unable to complete its work 
on time, the Congress reformed the law, extending the Assembly’s mandate 
until December 2007 but also making it clear that only the Congress (rather 
than the executive) had the authority to convoke the referendum needed to 
approve the Assembly’s draft constitution, by a law receiving two-thirds 
approval.151 In general, the rules seemed designed to ensure that neither 
group could steamroll the other and impose a constitution.152 Further, the 
revised law gave the Congress a sort of last word by giving it the power to 
call the approval referendum.153 
The electoral rules functioned about as expected. In elections in July, 
Morales’s MAS won a majority of seats, but the opposition, led by 
Podemos, won more than the one-third necessary to block an imposed 
constitution.154 The structure set up to externally control the Assembly, 
however, never functioned in a stable manner: MAS consistently attacked 
the legitimacy of these constraints. Even before the Assembly had been 
sworn in, Morales and members of MAS floated the possibility that it 
would exercise “original constituent power.” Morales, for example, stated 
that the Assembly “must be above all of the constituted powers, but 
submitted to the social movements because it was those movements that 
 
local or departmental level, thus allowing both Morales’ allies and the opposition to form unified lists 
when desired. See id. art. 19. 
148. See id. art. 6. 
149. See id. arts. 25–26. 
150. See id. art. 24 (stating that the duration of the assembly must be between six months and one 
year). 
151. See Ley 3728, Aug. 4, 2007, arts. 1, 4, available at http://www.lexivox.org/norms/BO-L-
3728.xhtml (“The Congress of the Republic will convoke, by a Law of the Republic, approved by two-
thirds of the members present, the Referendum with binding character . . . .”). The original version of 
the law stated clearly that the executive had power to call the referendum. See Ley 3364, supra note 
146, art. 26 (“Once the mission of the Constituent Assembly has concluded, the Executive Power will 
convoke the Constituent Referendum . . . .”). 
152. See Cameron & Sharpe, supra note 131, at 72–74. The rules also permitted a referendum on 
departmental autonomy to be held concurrently with the election of the assembly. While the referendum 
failed nationally, it carried by a large margin in the half-moon region. See Lehoucq, supra note 141, at 
117–18. 
153. See Ley 3728, supra note 151, art. 4. 
154. The MAS won 50.9% of the vote and 54% of the seats, while Podemos won 24% of the 
seats. See Lehoucq, supra note 141, at 117. 
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gave them life.”155 Morales also called for the large-scale mobilization of 
indigenous groups and other social movements on Sucre during the 
Assembly, and organized a march of thousands of people which coincided 
with the weekend before its opening.156 
This general debate about the character of the Assembly fed into a 
more practical debate about what the two-thirds rule would mean—whether 
it required two-thirds approval of all articles individually or simply of the 
final text.157 MAS favored the latter position, while Podemos and other 
opposition parties fought for the former.158 This issue paralyzed the 
Assembly for about six months (at times preventing sessions from meeting 
due to a hunger strike carried out by female members of the Assembly), 
until the two sides were able to reach a compromise in February 2007.159 
The issue was marked by massive demonstrations on both sides. For 
example, in early December the “half moon” departments called a general 
strike, and MAS-related social movements responded with huge marches 
on Sucre.160 Finally, in February the two sides compromised, agreeing to 
use a two-thirds rule for approval of all constitutional articles until July 
2.161 
Once this issue had finally been settled, the two sides began working 
on the text in committee. The work of the committees showed that, while 
there were serious divisions, there was some possibility of overcoming 
them. There were difficult areas where the commissions were working 
towards consensus—for example there was broad agreement on increasing 
the autonomy both of the departments and of indigenous groups, although 
 
155. Asamblea originaria genera contradicción en el Gobierno, LA PRENSA, July 28, 2006, 
available at http://constituyentesoberana.org/info/?q=node/341; see also El MAS planteará poderes 
absolutos en la Asamblea, AGENCIA DE NOTICIAS FIDES, Aug. 17, 2006, available at 
http://constituyentesoberana.org/info/?q=node/463 (quoting a minister in the Morales administration as 
saying that the Assembly was not limited by the previous Constitution and that the Bolivian people—
not Congress—convoked the assembly). 
156. See Carlos Morales Peña, MAS to Mobilise 100,000 People to Sucre, LA PRENSA, Aug. 26, 
2007, available at http://boliviarising.blogspot.com/2007/08/mas-to-mobilise-100000-people-to-
sucre.html; El Poder Ejecutivo organiza la presión sindical a la Asamblea, LA RAZON (La Paz), Aug. 
12, 2006, available at http://constituyentesoberana.org/info/?q=node/435 (quoting a labor leader as 
saying that “we are going to ensure that all of the proposals presented by the social sector are taken into 
account”). 
157. Lehoucq, supra note 141, at 118. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. See, e.g., Presidente lamenta convocatoria a paro, EL DIARIO, Dec. 1, 2006, available at 
http://constituyentesoberana.org/info/?q=argumento-civicos (explaining the opposition’s call for a 
regional strike and the president’s reaction to that call). 
161. The two sides also agreed to debate both the majority and minority reports from the 
Assembly’s commissions, and to settle those questions where consensus could not be reached via 
referendum. See Constituyente logra, en consenso, reformar su sistema de votación, GRUPO LIDER, 
Feb. 15, 2007, available at http://www.derechoshumanosbolivia.org/noticia.php?cod_noticia= 
NT20070215103647. 
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there were still important disagreements at the level of detail.162 Still, even 
at this stage, popular movements and demonstrations were common and 
problematic for the Assembly—when it sat in Santa Cruz in April as part of 
a national tour, several members were physically attacked, and there were 
huge demonstrations by student groups and mining unions against specific 
proposals in the Committees.163 
Negotiations broke down completely in August 2007 over a peripheral 
issue, after some members proposed that the capital of the country, and all 
of its attendant functions, be moved from La Paz to Sucre.164 When 
members of the MAS passed, by a simple majority, a motion tabling the 
proposal, the reaction in Sucre was catastrophic.165 The city experienced an 
outpouring of violent uprisings which made it impossible for the Assembly 
to even meet during the late summer and fall.166 The protests were base-led 
rather than elite-led; the opposition did not consider the issue important and 
 
162. See, e.g., Analisis de Comisiones toman forma en la Asamblea Constituyente, GRUPO LIDER, 
Mar. 14, 2007, available at http://www.constituyentesoberana.org/3/noticias/ac/mar2007/ 
140307_1.html (noting agreements and areas of divergence in the commission charged with defining 
autonomy in the new constitution); Concluyo el Taller convocado por la Asamblea Constituyente, 
GRUPO LIDER, Mar. 14, 2007 (finding broad agreement in favor of legal pluralism or the idea that 
indigenous groups should be able to use their own law in many cases); Panorama de consensos y 
disensos, EL DEBER, April 8, 2007, available at http://constituyentesoberana.org/3/noticias/ac/ 
abril2007/080407_1.html (noting some agreements on both land policy and autonomy); Comision de 
Autonomias busca redactar informe único, EL DIARIO, June 5, 2007, available at 
http://www.constituyentesoberana.org/3/noticias/ac/jun2007/060607_1.html (stating that the members 
of the Commission on Autonomy were fairly close to being able to present one unified report to the 
Plenary). Even during this phase, however, the role of popular participation was problematic. See Por 
segundo día exaltados arremeten en contra de asambleístas y obligan a suspender sesiones, ABI, Apr. 
3, 2007, available at http://constituyentesoberana.org/3/noticias/ac/abril2007/040407_1.html. 
163. See Por segundo día, supra note 162 (physical violence against members of the assembly); 
Mineros y estudiantes protestan contra la Asamblea Constituyente en Bolivia, AGENCE FRANCE 
PRESSE, June 15, 2007, available at http://archivo.abc.com.py/2007-06-16/articulos/336825/mineros-y-
estudiantes-protestan-en-bolivia. Also, officials from the four departments of the “Half Moon” met in 
Tarija, declared themselves in a “state of emergency,” and emphasized that they would not comply with 
the new constitution if it did not meet their demands for autonomy. See Tras pronunciamiento de 
autoridades y cívicos de cuatro regiones  Acusan a la “media luna” de buscar fracaso de la Asamblea, 
EL DIARIO, June 1, 2007, available at http://constituyentesoberana.org/3/noticias/ac/ 
jun2007/010607_1 html. 
164. Bolivia has historically had a complex situation with a joint capital; the executive and 
legislative branches sat in La Paz, while the judiciary sat in Santa Cruz. The proposal was to move all 
functions of government to Sucre. 
165. See El MAS asegura que el retiro de la capitalidad de la Constituyente fue un acto legal, 
ABI, Aug. 16, 2007, available at http://www.constituyentesoberana.org/info/?q=articulo-22. Initially, 
much of the opposition (including parts of Podemos) supported this measure, because it saw it as a 
distraction from larger issues. See Eliminación del tema capitalidad del debate en la Asamblea 
Constituyente divide a Podemos, ABI, Aug. 16, 2007, available at 
http://www.constituyentesoberana.org/info/?q=division-podemos. Thus, this was not really a case of the 
leadership mobilizing the people; rather, the public in Sucre mobilized and changed the position of the 
opposition in a way that made it more intransigent. 
166. See, e.g., Continúa en riesgo la Constituyente y aún no aparece propuesta de solución para 
destrabarla, ABI, Sept. 25, 2007, available at http://comitedeapoyoabolivia.blogspot.com/2007/09/ 
contina-en-riesgo-la-constituyente-y.html. 
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most did not even favor moving the capital, but they embraced these 
protests once they became significant in size.167 In November, after failed 
negotiation attempts, the President of the Assembly convoked the 
Assembly in a military compound in Sucre in order to approve the text; the 
opposition however did not participate and labeled the actions illegal and 
“written with rifles and bayonets.”168 Large-scale riots in Sucre caused 
three deaths and about 200 injuries.169 Later the Assembly was moved to 
Oruro, a city near La Paz, and the final text was approved while social 
movements encircled the building and prevented the entrance of the 
opposition.170 
However, the negotiated external constraints gave the opposition a 
potential trump card: under the modified text of the law convoking the 
Assembly, Congress was charged with passing a bill calling the referendum 
which would approve the Assembly’s work, and the opposition had enough 
votes to block Congress from reaching the two-thirds necessary to pass 
such a law.171 These constraints again were contested. In February 2008, 
civil organizations close to Morales staged massive demonstrations, 
effectively preventing the opposition from reaching the floor, and allowing 
the majority to reach the requisite two-thirds to call the referendum.172 
After huge uprisings by groups around Santa Cruz, the referendum was 
suspended by the Electoral Court on vague and technical grounds, and sent 
back to the Congress again.173 The Electoral Court was the opposition’s 
 
167. Id. 
168. See Bolivia  saqueos y muerte en Sucre en protesta contra Asamblea Constituyente, AGENCE 
FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 25, 2007, available at http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5j5oknSy3qV 
TX5Q9_f6tDciTfFlxA. 
169. See id. 
170. See SALVADOR SCHAVELZON, EL PROCESO CONSTITUYENTE EN BOLIVIA (2006–2009): 
ENTRE EL ACUERDO MODERADO Y LA RUPTURA REVOLUCIONARIA 5 (2010). This was done after MAS 
secured in Congress a law that altered the special law of convocation to allow the Assembly to meet 
anywhere in the country, instead of just in Sucre. See Ley No. 3792, Nov. 28, 2007, available at 
http://www.lexivox.org/norms/BO-L-3792.html. 
171. See SCHAVELZON, supra note 170, at 6. The opposition claimed the approval by the 
Assembly was illegal—in particular they looked at a provision of the reformed special law of 
convocation that required a two-thirds majority of “the members of the Constituent Assembly” (the 
original text had required two-thirds approval of “those present.”) See id. at 5–6 n.5. 
172. See Lehoucq, supra note 141, at 118; see also Ley No. 3836, Feb. 29, 2008, available at 
http://www.lexivox.org/norms/BO-L-3836.xhtml. Because the earlier version of the law did not allow a 
referendum both deciding between conflicting versions of the text and determining approval of the 
constitution as a whole at the same time, Congress also amended the convocation law yet again. See 
Ley No. 3837, Feb. 29, 2007, available at http://www.lexivox.org/norms/BO-L-3837.xhtml. 
173. See Resolución No. 013/2008, Mar. 7, 2008 (National Electoral Court). The Court 
specifically held that the Congress had illegally held a referendum on deciding between conflicting 
constitutional provisions (where there was disagreement between majority and minority) together with a 
referendum on deciding the constitutionality of the Constitution as a whole, and that it had modified the 
special law convoking the assembly to allow the two referendums to be held together only just after it 
had approved the referendum itself. See id. 
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only real option because the other judicial institutions had effectively been 
neutralized. The Constitutional Court, for example, had been left without a 
quorum because five of the remaining magistrates had resigned after MAS 
members of the Congress started impeachment proceedings against them.174 
Observers responding to this stage of the process saw the Assembly as 
a highly destabilizing force in Bolivian politics. They noted that it greatly 
increased regional tensions and was viewed by the citizenry as a “collective 
farce.”175 They also viewed the “very future of the country [as] seriously at 
stake” and saw a civil war or at least significant armed confrontation as the 
likely result.176 
Yet the MAS did not make further attempts to ignore or marginalize 
the constraints placed on the Assembly; instead, the two sides reached an 
agreement behind closed doors in October 2008. The Congress agreed to 
call a referendum on a constitutional text that had been modified in 
important ways.177 In particular, MAS made important concessions that 
increased regional autonomy and decreased the statist nature of the 
economy.178 The referendum was approved in January with 61% of the vote 
in favor and 39% opposed.179 
The process in Bolivia highlights several key points. The first is that 
the significant external constraints on the Assembly did affect the 
outcome—they reinforced the power of the opposition and allowed it to 
extract concessions throughout the process. But they also proved highly 
unstable—throughout the process, members of the MAS majority 
threatened to ignore these constraints because of the Assembly’s “original” 
character, which placed it above other political institutions. This instability 
was made much worse by the incredible levels of popular involvement on 
both sides. Podemos and MAS were both able to rally large numbers of 
people on cue, effectively turning Sucre into a war zone. This kind of 
mobilization eventually fractured the Assembly over a relatively 
unimportant issue (the location of the capital) and probably prevented the 
two sides from reaching what would have been a possible agreement on 
broad issues. The result was a near breakdown of order, although one that 
was avoided at the last minute by a compromise between rival groups. 
 
174. See Lehoucq, supra note 141, at 119–20. 
175. See Gamarra, supra note 125, at 139. 
176. See id. at 149–50; see also Lahoucq, supra note 141, at 122 (“Unless more moderate 
factions in both camps can fashion an institutional compromise that satisfies each side’s hardliners, 
violence will settle what is turning out to be a conflict of epic proportions in the central Andes.”) 
177. See Bolivian Reforms Deal Reached,’ BBC (Oct. 21, 2008, 9:06 GMT), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7681413.stm. 
178. For a detailed comparison of the modifications to the text carried out by Congress, see Silvia 
Raquel Mejia L., Análisis comparativo de los textos de la nueva Constitución Política del Estado 
(2009), available at http://constituyentesoberana.org/3/noticias/ac/112008/051108_1.pdf. 
179. See, e.g., SCHAVELZON, supra note 170, at 1. 
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2. Outcome 
Experts in the aftermath of the Bolivian constitution-making process 
were unclear what exactly to make of the final product. Some felt that 
MAS had made major concessions, while others felt that Morales had won 
on most of the major points.180 The text was praised by many actors for 
representing a novel synthesis of ideas, particularly in the incorporation of 
indigenous groups and in constructing a multicultural state.181 But the 
major effects of the constituent assembly, again, were probably not in the 
text. During the constitutional process itself, there can be little doubt that 
the Constituent Assembly made things much worse by heightening tensions 
on both sides—the chaotic fights to control the Assembly, coupled with the 
high levels of participation, made the differences between the half-moon 
region and Morales’ supporters even more salient. In 2008, the departments 
located in the half-moon part of the country held referendums on new 
autonomy statutes that asserted very high (and unconstitutional) levels of 
power for their regions; these statutes were approved in regional referenda 
by large margins.182 
Once the agreement occurred, however, it appears to have had a 
calming effect. Politically, the agreement helped to unify the country and to 
reduce regional tensions. Morales, for example, won a far higher 
percentage of the vote in the half-moon region in 2009 than he had initially 
in 2005.183 Moreover, the process appears to have taught Morales and his 
supporters a considerable amount about governing—the tortured process of 
getting the new constitution approved helped MAS evolve from a radical 
opposition movement that was accustomed to protesting on the streets to a 
more reformist movement that was willing to cut meaningful deals with the 
opposition.184 
 
180. Compare Nueva Carta Magna, cambiada por el Congreso, más blanda con los grandes 
propietarios de tierras, BOLPRESS, Oct. 24, 2008, available at http://constituyentesoberana.org/ 
3/noticias/tierra/102008/241008_3.html (arguing that the constitution had greatly weakened MAS’s 
proposals), with Referendo constitucional en Bolivia fortalece a Morales, fractura oposición, AGENCE 
FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 6, 2009, available at http://www.tribunalatina.com/es/viewer.php?IDN=15119 
(arguing that the overall process had greatly aided Morales by splitting the opposition between 
moderate and more extreme components). 
181. See Cameron & Sharpe, supra note 131, at 72–73. 
182. See George Gray Molina, The Challenge of Progressive Change Under Evo Morales, in 
LEFTIST GOVERNMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA: SUCCESSES AND SHORTCOMINGS 63 (Kurt Weyland et al. 
eds., 2010) (noting that the autonomy statutes “reverse[ed] the areas of national and departmental 
responsibility in almost mirror fashion” and “demonstrat[ed] a radical disagreement over autonomies 
and decentralization of the state”). 
183. He won 41% of the vote in the half-moon heartland of Santa Cruz in 2009, up from 33% in 
2005. See JEFFERY R. WEBBER, FROM REBELLION TO REFORM IN BOLIVIA: CLASS STRUGGLE, 
INDIGENOUS LIBERATION, AND THE POLITICS OF EVO MORALES (2011). 
184. Cf. id. (arguing that Morales’s movement had become much more moderate and conciliatory 
through time, but attributing this to changes in the leadership of the movement). 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS 
The constitution-making processes surveyed above were about short-
term, ordinary politics. Rather than being moments where politicians rose 
above ordinary political interests, both of the Assemblies here were used by 
political forces as alternative ways to carry out their political goals. 
Moreover, politicians used ideas about “constituent power” and appeals to 
“the people” as a mask for their short-term goals. They abused the rhetoric 
and instruments of constitutional politics—assemblies, plebiscites, mass 
participation—to achieve particular political goals. In reality, these 
Assemblies did not represent all of the people, nor were they moments 
where political communities defined their fundamental identities or 
engaged in particularly high levels of deliberation. They were political 
instruments, like other political institutions, that were used for political 
purposes and that served the interests of particular political groups. In 
Venezuela, forces around Chávez saw the Assembly as a way to quickly 
clean out hostile institutions that were still staffed with the traditional 
parties hostile to Chávez. In Bolivia, both MAS and its opponents saw the 
Constitutional Assembly as a way to gain political leverage on the other 
side. This point is important for the design of constitution-making 
processes: it suggests that the main goal in many cases should be to control 
exercises of power under difficult conditions, rather than to somehow 
shepherd politics into a second, higher-politics track. And it suggests that 
constitutional politics can be both destabilizing and dangerous, allowing 
particular individuals or groups to threaten democratic order in seemingly 
legitimate ways. 
Further, the case studies show that constitution-making, which often 
occurs when political institutions are very weak and contested, can raise a 
threat of one of two unfavorable outcomes. First, strongmen or strong 
parties might unilaterally impose an authoritarian or only weakly 
democratic regime, as occurred in Venezuela. Other scholars have found 
similar evidence in other regions: Partlett, drawing upon transitions in 
Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics in Asia, shows how powerful 
strongmen in that region tended to use constitution-making to entrench 
themselves in power and to create similar competitive authoritarian or 
weakly democratic regimes.185 Second, constitutions imposed by one group 
on another might cause the breakdown of order in the state, as very nearly 
happened in Bolivia. The case studies thus support the view that control 
over unilateral exercises of power should be a central—if not the central—
purpose of design of the process 
 
185. See Partlett, supra note 29. 
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Finally, while recent work has focused on the risk that a single 
charismatic individual, normally a president or similar figure, will 
manipulate the process to produce an undemocratic constitution,186 single 
parties as well as powerful individuals can be a threat to democracy. The 
contrast between Bolivia and Venezuela is instructive. In Venezuela, 
Chávez dominated his movement and was able to bend it to fit his personal 
ambitions. In Bolivia, Morales was in a different position—he was the 
leader of MAS, but he was highly constrained by forces within his party.187 
Still, the MAS effort to impose a constitution proved deeply problematic 
for Bolivian democracy. Many of the most durable and effective 
authoritarian regimes historically have been single-party states that were 
not highly personalist in nature; the high degree of institutionalization of 
the party has actually helped the regime survive the death or fall in 
popularity of a single figure.188 This suggests that unilateral exercises of 
power of any kind can be a threat to competitive democracy. 
In this Part, I raise several implications based on the findings from the 
case studies. While the case studies show that there is a need to control 
majoritarian political forces during constitution-making processes, they 
also show that this can be very challenging to achieve. A line of important 
theoretical work in political science argues that politics is fundamentally 
about institutionalization and organization: politics is most successful at 
channeling conflict when strong institutions mediate political groupings 
and interests.189 Constitution-making tends to occur when such institutions 
are either weak or absent, and moreover constitution-making (as in both 
countries studied here) is itself often a potent threat to whatever remains of 
the existing institutional order. In Subpart A, I discuss the prospects for 
different kinds of control, concluding in particular that external controls 
may fail in certain conditions. Subpart B intervenes in the debate on forum 
in constitution-making, suggesting that the framework presented here is 
 
186. See id. at 209–33 (describing similar processes in Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan). 
187. See supra text accompanying note 130. 
188. See, e.g., JUAN J. LINZ & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND 
CONSOLIDATION: SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 38–65 (1996) 
(defining authoritarian regime types and explaining how these types affect a transition to democracy); 4 
GUILLERMO O’DONNELL & PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER, TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: 
TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES 15–36 (Guillermo O’Donnell & Philippe 
C. Schmitter eds., 1989) (making a more general argument based on transitions in Southern Europe and 
Latin America); Jose Antonio Crespo, Party Competition in Mexico  Evolution and Prospects, in 
DILEMMAS OF POLITICAL CHANGE IN MEXICO 57, 59–63 (Kevin J. Middlebrook ed., 2004) (explaining 
the long-run success of the dominant Mexican PRI party in these terms). 
189. For the seminal work in this vein, see HUNTINGTON, supra note 50. For important 
applications of these ideas in modern political science, see, for example, BUILDING DEMOCRATIC 
INSTITUTIONS: PARTY SYSTEMS IN LATIN AMERICA 21–22 (Scott Mainwaring & Timothy R. Scully 
eds., 1995) (arguing that an important element in determining how a political system functions is how 
“institutionalized” its party system is); LEVITSKY & WAY, supra note 51, at 5 (arguing that competitive 
authoritarian regimes are a response to weakly institutionalized conditions). 
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relevant to that debate. Subpart C argues that high levels of public 
participation may in some conditions be more of a hindrance to the 
constitution-making process than a help. Finally, Subpart D responds to an 
important counter-argument—I argue there that the “constituent power” 
model is not necessary as a safety valve to allow for needed constitutional 
change in the name of historically disempowered groups, and that the risks 
of allowing such a safety valve outweigh its benefits. 
A. The Urgency and Difficulty of Finding Credible Forms of Control 
The key problem with respect to constraints in constitution-making is 
making those constraints credible or effective. We might highlight the point 
in the following way: the case studies suggest that pursuing a wholesale 
reconstruction of the constitutional order, rather than seeking reforms 
within the existing constitutional framework, may raise the risk of an 
unfavorable outcome. This is because constraint is often more difficult to 
achieve outside as opposed to inside a given constitutional framework. The 
complete reconstruction of a given constitutional order heightens 
ambiguities about rules and crises of order, and charismatic individuals or 
temporarily powerful parties can sometimes move outside of the existing 
constitutional framework in order to make an end-run around existing 
political institutions. Aside from the Venezuelan example here, two other 
recent attempts, by President Correa in Ecuador and President Zelaya in 
Honduras, show similar motivations: both sought to step outside the 
constitutional framework in order to achieve political goals that they lacked 
the power to achieve within it.190 As Arato has pointed out, legalistic 
reform within the existing constitutional framework may lower these 
risks.191 But the problem is that the choice to move outside of an existing 
constitutional framework is difficult to constrain, and is largely endogenous 
to the balance of politics in a given country. It is difficult to prevent 
sufficiently powerful actors or groups, like Chávez in Venezuela, from 
taking this step if they wish to do so. 
Still, different forms of control of constitution-making processes may 
have different levels of efficacy. Existing scholars who advocate a 
restrained or non-sovereign model of constitution-making do not often 
 
190. On the events in Honduras, see e.g., NOAH FELDMAN ET AL., REPORT TO THE COMMISSION 
ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION OF HONDURAS: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1915214. On President Correa’s constitutional 
assembly in Ecuador, see Marc Becker, Correa, Indigenous Movements, and the Writing of a New 
Constitution in Ecuador, 38 LATIN AM. PERSP. 47 (2011), available at http://www.yachana.org/ 
research/lap2011.pdf. 
191. See ARATO, supra note 34, at 80–84 (arguing that “legal continuity” and the use of 
amendment rules under the old constitution help to achieve consensus and improve the legitimacy of the 
new constitutional order). 
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consider whether the constraints imposed on the process will hold.192 In 
contrast, the case studies show that external constraints can be problematic 
and must be carefully designed in order to prove effective. In particular, the 
use of judiciaries to constrain constitution-makers, as was done in South 
Africa and is often advocated as a model for other processes, may prove 
ineffective. Given this fact, it is probably better to prioritize measures that 
ensure that the assembly is internally diverse, so that no single faction can 
act unilaterally. 
1. Internal Diversity 
Assemblies that are internally diverse, and where single parties or 
factions do not achieve clear majorities, tend to induce broad pacting 
between political groupings as a matter of course. For example, one might 
contrast the constitution-making process in Colombia in 1991 to the two 
examples focused on in this Article. In that case as well, a stable but 
restricted, pacted democracy was breaking down, and the declining 
traditional parties were clashing with insurgent parties over the structure of 
political competition and the shape of the state.193 But elections to the 
constituent assembly did not give a majority to any one party; instead, four 
groups won significant representation, with the largest party gaining only 
about one-third of the seats.194 Thus, the process was dominated by a stable 
pact between the two major insurgent parties (including an ex-guerrilla 
organization) and the most moderate incumbent party.195 The resulting 
constitution reconfigured politics in a way that created a more open and 
competitive (although still very flawed) political system.196 
 
192. See infra text accompanying notes 203–206. 
193. For more details on the background of the Colombian process, see, for example, John 
Dugas, La Constitución Politica de 91  ¿Un Pacto Politico Viable?, in LA CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1991: 
¿UN PACTO POLITICO VIABLE? 15, 38 (John Dugas ed., 1993) [hereinafter LA CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1991]; 
RAFAEL BALLEN M., CONSTITUYENTE Y CONSTITUCIÓN DEL 91, at 129–181 (1991); Fernando Cepeda 
Ulloa, Colombia  The Governability Crisis, in CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN LATIN 
AMERICA, supra note 57, at 193. 
194. See John Dugas, El Desarrollo de la Assemblea Nacional Constituyente, in LA 
CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1991, supra note 193, at 45, 47 tbl.1 (giving the percentages of votes won by each 
group). 
195. For example, the parties were forced to pact in order to agree on restructuring the judiciary, 
reworking electoral laws, and closing down the current congress. See Edgar Torres, Dan Luz Verde’ a 
la Corte Constitucional, EL TIEMPO, May 4, 1991, at 6A (judicial restructuring); HUMBERTO DE LA 
CALLE, CONTRA TODAS LAS APUESTAS: HISTORIA INTIMA DE LA CONSTITUYENTE DE 1991, at 147–48, 
210–12 (2004) (electoral rules and revoking of Congress). Across these cases, the resulting political 
configuration helped to open up these institutions to increased political competition. 
196. See, e.g., Mauricio Cardenas et al., Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes in Colombia  
The Effects of the 1991 Constitution, in POLICYMAKING IN LATIN AMERICA: HOW POLITICS SHAPES 
POLICIES 199, 242 (Ernesto Stein & Mariano Tommasi eds., 2008) (“[T]he 1991 Constitution was a 
clear gain in terms of representativeness and legitimacy of the political system.”); Dugas, supra note 
194 (arguing that the new constitution is a “viable political pact”); Fernando Cepeda Ulloa, Colombia  
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This suggests that to the extent possible, designers of constitution-
making processes might want to prioritize electoral rules and other 
instruments that will help to achieve diversity. Many of these measures are 
well-known in the political science and institutional design literatures but 
are worth discussing briefly here.197 First, it is obvious from the case 
studies that electoral law is a critical tool in translating popular support at a 
given point in time into seats. In Venezuela, Chávez successfully used a 
first-past-the-post system to ensure that he would receive far more seats 
than votes—he translated roughly 60% support into roughly 95% of the 
seats, therefore leaving opposition forces with virtually no voice. In Bolivia 
and Colombia, more proportional electoral systems helped to ensure that 
this kind of distorting effect did not occur; votes translated relatively 
directly into seats. Systems with single-member districts and similar 
majoritarian devices might have much to commend themselves in ordinary 
politics, where representativeness must be traded off against governance.198 
But as others have recognized, they make little sense in constitutional 
assemblies, where the pressing need is preventing a small faction from 
making an end-run around other forces and institutions.199 
In contrast, few actors have considered the role of timing in the 
elections to a Constituent Assembly. The prevailing conception seems to be 
that timing is fixed by external events—actors are forced to write a 
constitution because of regime change or some other event outside of their 
own control, ensuring, as Elster argues, that constitutions are normally 
written in very difficult moments.200 But even in cases of regime change, 
there may be some possibility of delaying elections, as the recent debate 
over the timing of the Egyptian elections shows.201 Timing is particularly 
important for the elections to a constitution-making body because the work 
of that body will often have long-term consequences on the polity. In 
Venezuela, Bolivia, and Colombia, new constitutions were written in 
 
Democratic Security, Political Reform, in CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN LATIN 
AMERICA, supra note 64, at 209, 213 (stating that the 1991 constitution “helped encourage power 
sharing” and “helped channel numerous social, economic, and political conflicts into institutional 
forums”); Segura & Bejarano, supra note 70, at 232 (noting that a “democratic constitution” emerged 
from the “balanced Assembly” of Colombia). 
197. For key works treating electoral rules and their influences on outcomes, see, e.g., GIOVANNI 
SARTORI, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING: AN INQUIRY INTO STRUCTURES, 
INCENTIVES, AND OUTCOMES (2d ed. 1997); AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACIES: PATTERNS OF 
MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUS GOVERNMENT IN TWENTY-ONE COUNTRIES (1984). 
198. See SARTORI, supra note 197, at 39–48. 
199. See, e.g., Elster, supra note 1, at 395 (“Elections to the constituent assembly ought to follow 
the proportional system rather than the majority system.”); Ginsburg et al., supra note 29. 
200. See ELSTER, supra note 6, at 78–80 (noting that constitution makers in Eastern Europe had 
little control over the timing of constitution-making and were forced to write new constitutions in 
situations that were not conducive to good constitution-making). 
201. See infra text accompanying notes 243–252. 
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moments where old political orders were breaking down. The pacted 
democracies that had dominated all three countries prior to the constitution-
making moment had lost legitimacy and thus electoral support. In 
Venezuela, the elections to the Constituent Assembly occurred in a moment 
in which the traditional parties had imploded, but no other political parties 
were well-organized enough to take their place. This left Chávez’s 
movement as the only well-organized movement in the country; the lack of 
organized opposition to Chávez reflected not the lack of ideological 
opposition, but the lack of organization among the opposition at that point 
in time. In Bolivia, by contrast, the older parties had disintegrated but had 
been replaced not only by MAS but also by a strong, well-organized set of 
opposition parties in the East. And in Colombia, the traditional parties had 
been weakened but not completely destroyed; further, the newer political 
forces themselves were plural in nature.202 This suggests that timing can 
sometimes make a big difference in determining how an assembly is 
composed and thus what constitutional program it enacts. 
2. External Control 
Prominent scholars have recommended models of constitution-making 
that emphasize controls on the constitution-making body. Arato argues, for 
example, that the two-stage process found in South Africa is an ideal model 
of constitution-making.203 Indeed, the South African model is widely touted 
as an innovative and successful way to achieve a true constitutional 
moment—adherents emphasize that the process encouraged consensus and 
yet also involved a very high degree of participation, a point I return to 
below in Subpart D.204 They also argue that it helped to facilitate higher 
forms of politics by allowing for political and social “learning” during the 
constitution-making process.205 The South African model relies on a mix of 
internal and external controls—internally, in the first stage, the major 
players pact to form a transitional constitution that lays out basic principles, 
and then, in the second stage, a popularly elected constituent assembly or 
parliament is controlled externally by being made subject to basic ideas or 
 
202. See supra notes 193–194. 
203. See ARATO, supra note 34, at 59–97 (using the South African constitutional process as a 
model for Iraqi constitution-making). 
204. See, e.g., Heinz Klug, Participating in the Design  Constitution-Making in South Africa, 3 
REV. CONST. STUD. 18 (1996) (arguing that the South African process enjoyed a high degree of 
legitimacy because it arose out of a very participatory process). 
205. See ARATO, supra note 34, at 69–72 (stating that “[t]he two-stage process rightly 
constructed creates an intermediary site of learning, because it invites the constitution makers to learn 
between the two stages and apply the results when drafting the final constitution”). 
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principles found in the transitional constitution.206 A constitutional court or 
similar body will judge whether the final constitution comports with the 
values of the initial constitution. The role of the court is “central” because 
it allows for “enforcement” of the external constraints represented by the 
transitional constitution.207 This model would, of course, provide the kinds 
of controls against unilateral constitutionalism that I call for here. But there 
is no real explanation in the model of whether and when the constraints 
imposed on paper would prove to be effective in practice. 
The case studies suggest that external constraints on constitution-
making bodies can be problematic in some situations. Moreover, the major 
constraint in the South African case—the external supervision of a court—
may be the least likely kind of constraint to work. In all three countries, 
judiciaries were supposed to play some role in controlling their 
Constitutional Assemblies, but their attempts bore little fruit. The efforts of 
the Venezuelan Supreme Court to use complex doctrines that would bind 
the assembly to the spirit but not the text of the existing constitutional order 
failed.208 These constraints were ignored, and when they were ignored 
judiciaries did not do anything about it. A similar result obtained in the 
Colombian constitutional assembly in 1991—attempts by the Supreme 
Court to allow a constituent assembly while simultaneously imposing loose 
constraints on it proved ineffective.209 And the judiciary in Bolivia played 
only a very small role in enforcing the textual constraints that existed on 
that Assembly. MAS was able to literally empty out the Constitutional 
Court, and even in the moment at which the Electoral Court blocked MAS 
from submitting its unilateral text to the people, the court took refuge in a 
dubious brand of legal formalism rather than confronting the majority 
head-on.210 
A significant part of the reason for these failures may be doctrinal and 
conceptual—the lure of the “original constituent power” doctrine has 
always been powerful in Latin America, and this doctrine makes it quite 
 
206. See, e.g., Christina Murray, Negotiating Beyond Deadlock  From the Constitutional 
Assembly to the Court, in THE POST-APARTHEID CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 46, at 103. 
207. See ARATO, supra note 34, at 84–85. 
208. See BREWER-CARÍAS, supra note 120, at 226–44. 
209. In a divided ruling, the Colombian Supreme Court ruled that a constituent assembly could be 
held even though in the text of the constitution, the Congress is the only institution stated to have 
amendment power. See BALLEN M., supra note 193, at 157–232 (reprinting the entire decision and its 
dissents). The majority of the Court held that the people constituted the “primary constituency, and 
therefore can at any time give themselves a constitution distinct from the one actually in force without 
subjecting themselves to the requirements that it consecrates.” Id. at 169–70. Still, as in Venezuela, the 
Court attempted to place vague limits on the Assembly, stating that it was required to act for the 
purpose of “strengthen[ing] the participatory-democratic system, via a participatory mechanism.” Id. at 
171. Once the decision had been issued, these limits remained theoretical and were ignored; the 
judiciary did nothing for example when the assembly closed down the congress. 
210. See Lehoucq, supra note 141, at 119. 
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difficult to place limits on an Assembly’s actions.211 This doctrine plays 
less of a role in other parts of the world, for example in common law 
countries. But another part of the story is political—courts are normally 
weak political actors. They are easy to politicize and they often have little 
credibility, popularity, or salience with the public. It may be too much to 
expect them to take a successful stand against a popular majority that 
controls a constitution-making body, especially when they are directly 
attacked or threatened by that majority. In South Africa, the judiciary had 
considerable capacity and was not perceived as highly politicized.212 
Further, no actor there saw an interest in seriously contesting the 
underlying rules of the game. These conditions will not always hold. 
Bolivia suggests a second route that might work better. First, 
procedures for calling a constituent assembly were defined in the existing 
constitutional text. Such provisions appear to be rare in existing 
constitutional law, and they might indeed have drawbacks by encouraging 
too-frequent constitution-making. Further, in many cases, it will be 
impossible to define such procedures a priori because the new constitution 
is the result of a fundamental change in regime type (i.e. from an 
authoritarian to a democratic regime). But where possible, these kinds of 
provisions also hold out some potential to regulate the constitution-making 
process and therefore to ensure that it is not abused for narrow partisan 
ends. Second, both the constitutional text and the subsequent laws that 
Congress passed based on that text relied on two-thirds voting thresholds in 
both the Assembly and the Congress, rather than enunciating basic 
principles or values to which the text had to adhere. Voting thresholds are 
more difficult than principles to work around. And political actors may 
have substantial resources—popular support and salience—that courts lack. 
This is not to suggest that the Bolivian route, which barely held, is ideal or 
unproblematic; indeed, a larger point of the case studies is that external 
constraints are problematic in any form. 
B. The Debate About Forum 
One of the most significant debates in the existing literature on 
constitution-making is about the forum: whether constitution-making is 
better carried out in ordinary legislatures or instead in specialized 
constitutional assemblies. As noted above, Elster and others assert that 
constitution-making should be done by a specialized body in order to 
minimize the role of group and institutional interests.213 A different group 
 
211. For a discussion, see Colón-Ríos, Legitimacy, supra note 33. 
212. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 206, at 119–21. 
213. See supra text accompanying notes 20–25. 
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of scholars advocates for a model in which constitution-making is done by 
an ordinary legislature.214 The evidence from Latin America suggests that 
the importance of this variable may be overstated. The outcome of a given 
process depends more on how the forum is composed and controlled than 
on what kind of forum it is. As an example, one can take the Venezuelan, 
Bolivian, and Colombian examples—all three were undertaken in 
specialized constituent assemblies, but with very different results. In 
Venezuela, the Assembly was indeed used by Chávez to consolidate a 
competitive authoritarian regime, although less by creating a very strong 
presidency on paper than by using the Assembly to clean out other 
institutions that were still controlled by the opposition. But in Bolivia and 
Colombia, the Assemblies were restrained—in Bolivia by external checks 
and in Colombia by the internal diversity of the Assembly itself—from 
carrying out the unilateral visions of any one party or actor. 
That said, the choice of forum may not be irrelevant. In particular, it 
may be easier for strongmen and other figures to control the timing of 
elections to extraordinary political assemblies than to ordinary legislatures 
because the timing of elections to the latter tends to be fixed. This may tend 
to reduce the internal diversity of constitutional assemblies. In Venezuela, 
for example, Chávez was able to time the election of the Assembly for just 
after his presidential election victory, allowing him to maximize his support 
and gain far more seats than he possessed in the Congress. Further, it may 
be more difficult to exercise effective external control over a constitutional 
assembly. The idea that such an assembly exercises the full sovereignty of 
the people may be much stronger than is the case for ordinary political 
bodies.215 In all three cases studied here, politicians, courts, and the public 
seemed effectively seduced by the idea that these assemblies genuinely 
represented the “original constituent power”; this conception may be 
largely due to regional legal culture, but also seemed due in part to the 
nature of the forum.216 It is more difficult to make similar arguments about 
ordinary legislative bodies, although as the Egyptian example below shows, 
ordinary parliaments can also make similar claims.217 Thus, the case studies 
indicate that the debate about forum may matter because it bears on the 
possibilities for exercising either internal or external control over the body. 
 
214. See supra text accompanying notes 26–29. 
215. See, e.g., Colón-Ríos, Legitimacy, supra note 33 (explaining the force of the “constituent 
power” argument and giving examples of its application). 
216. See Colón-Ríos, Carl Schmitt, supra note 33, at 384 n.62 (explaining the historical 
importance of the doctrine of “constituent power” in the region). 
217. See infra text accompanying notes 254–276 (explaining the military’s efforts to impose 
“principles” on the constitution-making process and the reactions of the various political groups). 
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C. Rethinking the Role of Participation 
Finally, the evidence here helps qualify one of the more important 
normative recommendations from existing work: that constitution-making 
should be highly participatory. Participation in constitution-making is said 
to increase the legitimacy of the constitution-making process, improve the 
quality of the product, and increase the civic virtue of citizens.218 Further, 
some scholars, led by Thomas Franck, have asserted that there is an 
emerging norm of customary international law that constitution-making be 
a very participatory process.219 These scholarly views in favor of 
participation are closely linked to the dualist theory of democracy, which 
holds that constitution-making moments are qualitatively different from 
ordinary political moments.220 
Empirical evidence on these claims about the value of participation is 
mixed. There are cases where high degrees of public participation have 
been successfully integrated into constitution-making processes: South 
Africa is a well-known example.221 The fascinating process in Iceland, 
where the drafting council is making massive use of social media to get 
input into the process, may be another.222 However, one large-n empirical 
study of post-conflict constitution-making found that levels of participation 
had no effect on post-constitution-making levels of violence in many 
regions of the world.223 Further, Moehler’s detailed fieldwork in Uganda 
found that citizens who had participated in that country’s constitution-
making process actually developed lower levels of trust in government than 
their fellow citizens who had participated less.224 Rather than instilling a 
sense of civic virtue, participation disenchanted citizens by acquainting 
them with a dysfunctional political system. 
Levels of participation in the examples studied for this Article were not 
highly correlated with the values attributed to participation. It is commonly 
noted in the literature that forms of participation such as referenda may 
have little effect on the process because they may be too manipulable to 
 
218. See supra text accompanying notes 36–42. 
219. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
220. See supra text accompanying note 36. 
221. See Klug, supra note 204, at 18–59. 
222. See Cheryl Saunders, Constitution-Making in the 21st Century, 2012 INT’L REV. L., no. 4, 
2012, at 1, 8. 
223. See Jennifer Widner, Constitution Writing and Conflict Resolution (UNU-WIDER Research 
Paper No. 2005/51, Aug. 2005); see also Jennifer Widner, Constitution Writing in Post-Conflict 
Settings  An Overview, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513 (2008) (discussing these results). 
224. See DEVRA C. MOEHLER, DISTRUSTING DEMOCRATS: OUTCOMES OF PARTICIPATORY 
CONSTITUTION MAKING (2008). 
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control power.225 But more hands-on forms of constitution-making like 
civil society participation may also do little to enhance either the quality or 
legitimacy of the constitutional product. In Venezuela, very high levels of 
participation by civil society had no real impact on the final product but 
rather tended to affect peripheral provisions that were unimportant to 
Chávez and which constituted mere window-dressing. High levels of civil 
society participation did not prevent the constitution from being used to 
impose a competitive authoritarian regime.226 
Bolivia offers a more important point: very high levels of participation, 
at least in a polarized political environment, may make constitution-making 
much more difficult and may thus threaten a breakdown of order.227 Elster 
and others have noted that conducting deliberations in public may 
sometimes make agreement more difficult because representatives working 
under the conditions may stick to their principles and be unwilling to make 
hard political compromises.228 But what happened in Bolivia is more what 
Elster calls “threat-based bargaining”: both sides attempted to mobilize 
portions of the masses in order to pressure the other side into a favorable 
deal.229 The trouble is that this is a dangerous game in two senses. First, as 
Elster notes, the masses on each side, once mobilized and ideologically 
charged, may narrow the range of possible agreement, perhaps even 
causing it to disappear entirely.230 Bolivian delegates were unwilling to 
make deals that they otherwise would have cut for fear of angering their 
mass supporters. Second, the mobilized masses might start agitating for 
 
225. See, e.g., HART, supra note 40, at 35–36 (“The oft-cited function of legitimizing the text, 
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participatory and are largely a product of elite pacts or “gentleman’s agreements”; Colombia stands as 
an example. The referendum on whether to call the Assembly and the elections to that Assembly (which 
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political institutions necessary to contain and channel them). 
228. See Elster, supra note 1, at 388–89. 
229. See id. at 390–93 (giving examples of threats such as military force that shaped constitution-
making in France). 
230. See id. at 388–89. 
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their own purposes and not those of the political elites. In Bolivia, the 
assembly essentially broke down over an issue, the location of the capital 
city, which was pushed by the masses in Sucre rather than by any of the 
party elites. These conditions—highly mobilized and polarized mass 
supporters—may be fairly common during regime changes in the 
developing world. As noted below, in some respects Egypt may combine 
similarly high levels of participation with significant polarization.231 And 
constitutional moments combine sets of factors that may make mass 
participation particularly difficult to process: mass expectations are often 
unrealistically high, and there are no institutional frameworks capable of 
channeling the public’s demands. 
None of this indicates that mass participation is a bad idea under all 
circumstances. But it may help qualify its utility: in certain circumstances, 
direct mass participation appears manipulable, and in poorly 
institutionalized environments mass participation can actually help 
contribute to a democratic breakdown. 
D. Constrained Constitutionalism and the Need for Flexibility 
The deliberative democracy rationale provided by Elster and Ackerman 
is not the only, and perhaps not even the best, defense of the constitutional 
moment theory. An alternative defense relies on the need for flexibility in 
constitutional systems. The clearest recent articulation of this defense is 
made by Joel Colón-Ríos, who argues that the “original constituent power” 
doctrine has played a positive role in Latin America as a kind of safety 
valve.232 Ordinary political institutions often become warped by the 
interests of particular powerful actors and no longer serve the public good. 
The original constituent power doctrine allows for radical change in the 
interests of disempowered groups, and this kind of change would be 
impossible without the existence of the doctrine.233 
This challenge to the constrained model is powerful and thought-
provoking. In this Subpart I content myself with offering a few responses. 
First, as with claims that the original constituent power is being exercised 
on behalf of the people, claims that such power is being exercised on behalf 
of historically disenfranchised groups are sometimes—and perhaps 
usually—abused. It can be tempting for powerful individuals and groups to 
claim that they are blowing up the institutional order to aid groups who 
have been unjustly treated; these claims can be masks for what are 
 
231. For a discussion, see infra text accompanying note 239–252. 
232. See, e.g., Colón-Ríos, Carl Schmitt, supra note 33, at 384 n.62; Colón-Ríos, Legitimacy, 
supra note 33. 
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essentially power grabs by would-be dictators. The contrast between 
Bolivia and Venezuela might be illustrative here; while it is plausible in the 
Bolivian case to say that power was being exercised on behalf of 
historically disenfranchised indigenous groups, such a claim is more 
dubious in Venezuela, where Chávez used the process largely to 
consolidate his own hold on power (which he never subsequently 
relinquished). 
More fundamentally, there are serious questions about whether the 
constituent power model of political change is effective at creating positive 
change. These models tend to function via domination of one group by 
another and particularly by excluding historic elites from power. But these 
excluded groups then tend to either use their resources to destabilize the 
new regime (as would have happened in Bolivia) or to simply exit the 
country (as has happened in part in Venezuela). Under either scenario, 
governance and economic development becomes much more difficult. 
Further, observers have noted two patterns of leftist government in 
Latin America.234 Under the first model, observed in Venezuela, Bolivia, 
and Ecuador, governments have relied on exercises of constituent power to 
radically remake the institutional order, and to exclude political and 
economic elites from the preceding regime (who are perceived as corrupt 
and ineffective) from power.235 Under the second model, observed in 
Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, governments instead have attempted to enact 
reforms within the existing constitutional order, relying on these 
institutions to enact incremental reforms.236 While all is not equal between 
these two groups of countries (the second group, for example, has tended to 
have stronger institutional structures than the first), the second approach 
appears to have paid generally bigger dividends and paid far fewer costs. 
These governments have made important changes to social policies without 
sacrificing economic growth or political stability.237 
V. THE THEORY APPLIED: EGYPT IN PERSPECTIVE 
In this Part, I briefly apply the theory to the just-completed efforts at 
constitution-making in Egypt. I cannot provide anything like a full 
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perspective on the current political and social movements in the country; 
nor is my aim here to provide normative advice. Further, I do not wade into 
the extremely complex debate over the value of the final constitutional 
product or its individual provisions.238 My goals instead are far more 
modest: I seek to show that the perspective presented in this Article is 
useful for understanding recent events. My primary point is that the role of 
the military is more complex than sometimes recognized—in a context 
raising many of the risks of a worst-case outcome, the military might 
actually play a positive role in stabilizing the emerging democracy and 
preventing an authoritarian outcome. This analysis thus contributes to Sam 
Issacharoff’s important point—fragile or unstable democratic regimes 
might require undemocratic features in order to survive.239 
The fall of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt in February 2011 ended a military-
linked authoritarian regime that had lasted for decades and placed the 
country into a situation that is similar to, but more severe than, the regime 
breakdowns in the Latin American case studies.240 An important challenge 
in such an environment is the reconstitution of order and the reconstruction 
of political institutions. This is a task that might not happen at all, or 
(perhaps more likely) might happen but under a non-democratic or weakly 
democratic regime. 
While Mubarak’s authoritarian party (the National Democratic Party) 
was disbanded, new political movements are nascent, and some movements 
are already well-organized. As in Venezuela, the situation was one in 
which political organization during the constitution-making process was 
asymmetric; in general, Islamist parties were already organized while 
liberal forces were not, and forces close to the old regime were in a process 
of possible reconstitution.241 The organized political forces are recognized 
by observers as largely pursuing their short-term political interest.242 In 
 
238. See, e.g., Clark Lombardi & Nathan R. Brown, Islam in Egypt’s New Constitution, Post to 
The Middle East Channel, FOREIGN POLICY (Dec. 13, 2012, 10:23 AM), 
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/13/islam_in_egypts_new_constitution. 
239. See Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 1405 (arguing that weaker democracies may need to have 
mechanisms in place that limit the rights of extremist groups as a means of self-preservation); see also 
Ozan Varol, The Democratic Coup d’Etat, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 292 (arguing that militaries are not 
necessarily anti-democratic actors during democratic transitions). 
240. See, e.g., JEREMY M. SHARP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33003, EGYPT IN TRANSITION 9–
10 (2011). 
241. See INT’L FOUND. FOR ELECTORAL SYS., ELECTIONS IN EGYPT: ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM (2011) [hereinafter ELECTIONS IN EGYPT: ANALYSIS] (“Analysts 
also identify the FJP [the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood party] . . . and remnants of the National 
Democratic Party as the most coherent and organized movements.”). 
242. See, e.g., Mara Revkin, The Brewing Battle over Egypt’s Constitution, ATLANTIC COUNCIL 
(Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.acus.org/egyptsource/brewing-battle-over-egypts-constitution (recognizing 
that the Islamist Freedom and Justice party is seeking to use its currently strong political position to 
remake the rules in its favor). 
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such an environment, the risk recognized in this Article—that unilateral 
control of the assembly will lead to a non-democratic outcome—was very 
real. And it is mainly the structure of the constitution-making process—the 
asymmetric organization of political forces and the sovereign nature of the 
assembly—rather than the ideology of any particular group that created the 
risk. Finally, it is worth noting that these risks are exacerbated by the 
weakness of remaining institutions (most of which have either been 
dissolved or are badly tainted by association with the prior regime) and by 
the high levels of mass participation outside of any institutional framework. 
Mass protests were helpful in toppling Mubarak, but as the Bolivian case 
showed, they can make constitution-making processes far more difficult 
and traumatic. 
A. Asymmetric Organization and the Failure to Achieve Internal Diversity 
The electoral rules for parliamentary elections in Egypt, which were 
imposed by the military (but also at points negotiated with major political 
forces), were highly complex and seemed designed partly to avoid 
dominance by any one group.243 And since the parliament had been tasked 
with selecting the constituent assembly; this would presumably have helped 
avoid single-party dominance in the assembly as well. In the elections to 
the lower chamber of parliament, for example, two-thirds of seats were 
allocated by closed-list proportional representation in large districts, thus 
avoiding the type of distortion of votes into seats that occurred in 
Venezuela.244 The remaining one-third of seats were allocated via 
personalized voting in very small districts (similarly to the electoral system 
in the US); this type of system can cause an overrepresentation of majority 
forces (as occurred in Venezuela), but it was thought that the personalized 
dimension of the process would allow independents and figures associated 
with the prior regime to win large numbers of seats.245 
In practice, the electoral rules did not do a particularly good job of 
dispersing authority in the parliament. The Muslim Brotherhood (running 
as the Freedom and Justice Party) won about half the seats in the lower 
 
243. See ELECTIONS IN EGYPT: ANALYSIS, supra note 241, at 2–3 (explaining the process by 
which the new electoral laws were adopted); see also id. at 4 (noting that “analysts expect a highly 
fragmented political race with no one party or coalition coming close to a majority of the national 
vote”). 
244. See id. at 3–4. 
245. See id. at 4 (“Analysts expect those [personalized seats] . . . to be largely filled by local 
prominent citizens and former NDP partisans.”). The system differs from the U.S. system in that two 
candidates are elected from each district. See id. at 3. Another factor expected to work in favor of 
greater fragmentation was the fact that elections were staggered over a span of about three-and-a-half 
months, between November 2011 and March 2012. See id. at 4. 
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house, and the conservative Islamist Al-Nour party won another 25%.246 
Several smaller liberal parties and figures close to the old regime won the 
remaining quarter.247 
A similar result obtained in the presidential election. Most observers 
pushed for a rapid and complete transition to democracy.248 This had a 
critical effect on the timing of presidential elections: parties and analysts 
pushed for very quick presidential elections, prior to the constitution-
making process, as a way to push the military more fully out of power.249 
This election was also won by the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
Mohamed Morsi, who defeated a candidate who was very close to the old 
regime (former Prime Minister Ahmed Shahiq) by a 51–48 margin.250 
Thus, a single movement has dominated Egypt’s early elections. This 
suggests the importance of the timing variable discussed above. The 
conditions of asymmetric organization in Egypt did indeed seem to affect 
the outcome. Observers have recognized that the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Al-Nour were far more organized under the old regime, especially locally, 
than other political forces.251 The absence of support for more liberal or 
secular candidates may indicate a true lack of support, but it may also 
indicate failures of organization. Party-building takes time. Moreover, the 
perspective presented in this Article suggests that early presidential 
 
246. See Leila Fadel, Final Results Confirm Islamists Winners in Egypt’s Elections, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 21, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/.../gIQAXpwbGQ_story.html (stating that the 
Freedom and Justice Party won 47% of seats in the lower house, and the conservative Islamist Salafist 
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247. Id.; but see Egypt Elections  Results Show Islamists Taking Two Thirds of Seats, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 21, 2012, 7:21 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindian 
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lists). 
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Policy on Egypt Needs a Big Shift, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/12/01/opinion/us-policy-on-egypt-needs-a-big-shift.html (stating that “Washington should put the 
Egyptian military, which receives $1.3 billion annually from the United States, on notice that the 
officer’s efforts to carve out a post-transition political role for themselves is unacceptable.”); see also 
The White House, Statement by the Press Secretary on Recent Events in Egypt, Nov. 25, 2011, 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/25/statement-press-secretary-recent-
developments-egypt (“Most importantly, we believe that the full transfer of power to a civilian 
government must take place in a just and inclusive manner that responds to the legitimate aspirations of 
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249. See, e.g., Revkin, supra note 242 (stating that secular and liberal groups sought an 
immediate presidential election in order to end military rule). 
250. David D. Kirkpatrick, Named Egypt’s Winner, Islamist Makes History, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 24, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/world/middleeast/mohamed-morsi-of-muslim-brotherhood-
declared-as-egypts-president.html. 
251. See Revkin, supra note 242. 
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elections can be problematic: executives are often (although not always) 
the main forces pushing for authoritarian or non-democratic regime.252 
There is often substantial risk that an executive with control or near control 
over the constituent assembly can weaken the prospects for a competitive 
democratic outcome. Thus the electoral landscape in Egypt, coupled with 
the organizational asymmetries on the ground, produced a substantial risk 
of an undemocratic or weakly democratic outcome. 
B. The Mixed Record of External Control 
The most analytically complex element of the Egypt situation has been 
the role that the military and the judiciary, working together, have played to 
counter this threat. The irony is that while these elements, working on their 
own, are probably an even greater threat to democracy than the unequal 
electoral playing field, in the specific context of Egypt they have helped to 
control the dominant electoral faction (the Muslim Brotherhood) in ways 
that help to avoid a worst-case outcome. This analysis thus complements 
recent work by Ozan Varol, who has used the historical experiences in 
Turkey, Portugal, and elsewhere to argue that the military is a complex 
actor that can sometimes play a pro-democratic role.253 At the same time, 
the analysis supports a key conclusion from the Latin American case 
studies: using external institutions like courts to limit the power of 
constituent assemblies is a difficult strategy to pull off. 
The military’s early attempts to channel and control the constitution-
making process were clumsy, and in particular alienated liberal elements 
who might have supported some controls over the dominant electoral 
actors. Well before parliamentary and presidential elections had been held, 
the military attempted to impose sets of principles on the Constituent 
Assembly and to give the Constitutional Court the power to review the 
principles.254 When the idea was first floated in the summer of 2011, the 
idea was that these principles would give some protection to the military’s 
corporatist interests, while also aiding secular and liberal groups.255 The 
Freedom and Justice party steadfastly opposed any attempt to restrict the 
Assembly’s power (since such an effort was likely to hurt their political 
 
252. See supra Subpart III.A (discussing Chávez’s use of the constituent assembly to create a 
competitive authoritarian regime); Partlett, supra note 29 (explaining how strong executives in former 
Soviet countries used extraordinary constitution-making processes to entrench themselves in power). 
253. See Varol, supra note 239. 
254. For an overview, see INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, 
DECLARATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE NEW EGYPTIAN STATE, DRAFT DATED 1 
NOVEMBER 2011: A COMMENTARY 4 (2011) [hereinafter DECLARATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/2011.11_-_commentary_on_funda 
mental_principles_english_final.pdf. 
255. See id. 
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interests most of all); most media and outside observers agreed, viewing 
the military’s effort as blatantly undemocratic.256 The draft principles 
actually floated in November 2011 focused largely on carving out a 
massive role for the military within the new democratic order, but they also 
suggested that military itself (rather than the parliament) would play the 
dominant role in selecting the members of the Constituent Assembly.257 
They would have ensured the military full autonomy over its budget and a 
veto over any bills that related to the armed forces, for example.258 These 
principles were rejected by virtually all political actors, many of whom 
took to the streets in massive protests (which led to forty deaths), and the 
military quickly withdrew them.259 
This fiasco suggested again that imposing external control on an 
assembly is indeed very difficult. The political groupings around the 
Freedom and Justice Party had great success in arguing that any restrictions 
on the sovereignty of the parliament and the assembly would be per se 
undemocratic.260 They were able to argue these points despite the fact that 
many recent examples of constitution-making, most notably in South 
Africa, have been constrained in similar ways.261 Further, the course of 
dealing suggests strategic miscalculations by both the liberal/secular parties 
and the military. The military’s draft set of principles seem to have been 
intended as a starting point for bargaining, but the included principles were 
 
256. See, e.g., id. (noting that the Muslim Brotherhood and Freedom and Justice party referred to 
the effort as “an illegitimate and undemocratic usurpation of the people’s will.”); Guide to Egypt’s 
Transition, Constitutional Principles, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, [hereinafter 
Constitutional Principles], http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/10/04/constitutional-
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257. See DECLARATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 254, at 31 (explaining 
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258. See id. at 29 (“The Supreme Council for the Armed Forces is solely responsible for all 
matters concerning the armed forces, and for discussing its budget, which should be incorporated as a 
single figure in the annual state budget. The Supreme Council for the Armed Forces is also exclusively 
competent to approve all bills relating to the armed forces before they come into effect.”). 
259. See Matt Bradley, Egyptian Military Draws Fire over Politics, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 3, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB40001424052970204621904577014132319073706.html (stating that a 
“broad cross-section of Egyptian political parties lodged strong objections” to the principles and 
describing street protests that had been called in response); Edmund Blair, Egypt Army Affirms 
Parliament Role over Constitution, REUTERS, Dec. 11, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2011/12/11/us-egypt-constitution-idUSTRE7BA09720111211 (noting that the military had 
dropped the idea of playing a role in appointments to the assembly). 
260. See Bradley, supra note 259. 
261. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 206, at 103 (describing the South African model, where the 
parliament that drafted the final constitution was subject to principles found in an interim constitution, 
as judged by the South African Constitutional Court). 
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so outrageous (particularly the provision giving the military power to 
appoint most of the Assembly) that they were rejected out of hand by all 
the nascent political forces and thus left no room for further bargaining. 
Had a serious effort at such a pact occurred, it is possible that a more 
widely embraced set of principles could have emerged, which would have 
traded some guarantees for liberal and secular constitutional principles 
against some guarantees for the military within the constitutional order.262 
The military’s subsequent attempts to channel and limit electoral 
democracy were somewhat more sophisticated and effective. In recent 
efforts, the military has preferred to work through its allies, the courts, 
which are still stacked with personnel from the Mubarak era. While the 
judiciary is tainted by its association with the military regime, it may be a 
relatively legitimate institution in an environment where virtually all 
institutions have been discredited, destroyed, or both. The Egyptian 
Supreme Constitutional Court, for example, is a high capacity institution 
that was considered relatively independent during the military regime.263 In 
a preliminary ruling, the Supreme Administrative Court first suspended the 
Constitutional Assembly appointed by the Parliament, holding that the draft 
principles promulgated by the military were potentially in force and that the 
Assembly may not have been appointed in accord with those principles.264 
Then, in June, the Constitutional Court issued a ruling dissolving the 
Parliament itself, holding that the electoral rules used to elect some of its 
members were improperly promulgated.265 Another judicial decision by the 
Constitutional Court threw out rules that would have prevented Mubarak 
loyalists from running for president.266 All of these maneuvers were 
 
262. Cf. Constitutional Principles, supra note 256 (noting that civil society organizations and 
educational institutions had written draft principles in June and July 2011 that had received broad 
approval from across the political spectrum). Further, after the missed opportunity the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the military may have made a pact, where the former agrees to respect the latter’s 
power so long as the military leaves the constitution-making process free of its influence. See Revkin, 
supra note 242. 
263. See, e.g., TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: LAW, POLITICS, 
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT (2007) (describing and explaining the relatively high level of 
independence of the Constitutional Court during the dictatorships of Sadat and Mubarak). 
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266. See INT’L FOUND. FOR ELECTORAL SYS., ELECTIONS IN EGYPT: IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT 
COURT DECISIONS ON THE ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK 9–10 (2012) [hereinafter ELECTIONS IN EGYPT: 
IMPLICATIONS]. 
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predictably denounced by the Muslim Brotherhood and by outside 
observers as “judicial coups” or as “thuggish” actions.267 
These denunciations, particularly those made by outside observers, risk 
misunderstanding the result of the judiciary’s actions. These decisions 
appeared to have served as the starting point for negotiations between 
elected officials (including Morsi) and the military and judiciary, not as an 
end game that put a stop to the democratization process.268 Litigation and 
negotiations continued on the decisions that suspended the Assembly and 
dissolved Parliament.269 A second Constituent Assembly was selected to 
replace the suspended one, and that Assembly continued its work even 
though its “parent” institution, the Parliament, remained dissolved.270 
In the end the newly elected Morsi partly defanged both the military 
and the judiciary. He replaced many of the top military leaders and in 
November 2012 issued a decree insulating his decrees and the actions of 
the Assembly from judicial review until the new constitution was 
drafted.271 He reversed much of that decree after popular outcry.272 The 
Islamist-dominated Constituent Assembly, after the resignations of many of 
the other members, passed a new constitution in December 2012, and the 
constitution was approved by popular referendum, with 64% supporting the 
document in a low-turnout election.273 
The experience raises three points. First, the Egyptian experience 
shows again the great difficulty of efforts at external control. It is not clear 
that the efforts by the judiciary and military completely failed, even though 
Morsi was able to weaken both groups. The various decisions by the courts, 
and the threat of further action, may have influenced the final constitutional 
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product in certain ways.274 Nonetheless, the electorally dominant political 
forces can easily make judicial or military attempts at interference seem 
deeply undemocratic and illegitimate. Further, as in Bolivia, external 
control is a limited strategy because it is difficult to make adversary groups 
engage in dialogue. The judiciary was able to slow down the process and 
impose roadblocks, but could not force the dominant groups to engage in 
serious roundtable discussions with electorally weaker parties.275 However 
desirable roundtable discussions might be, they appear to be very difficult 
to mandate through design when the most powerful forces do not want 
them. 
Second, the judiciary in Egypt had more power than the Venezuelan or 
Bolivian judiciaries precisely because, unlike in those other countries, it 
was backed by an institution of power—the military. This suggests a 
difficult tradeoff. Those institutions best able to control power in fluid, 
deinstitutionalized contexts may be precisely those institutions most 
dangerous to democracy. The military is useful as an effective 
counterweight to dangerous forces in the new democracy; at the same time, 
it is itself a significant threat to that democracy. 
Finally, militaries, even ones previously involved in dictatorial 
regimes, do not necessarily play an undemocratic role in the constitution-
making process. In some conditions, they may facilitate democratization, 
precisely by avoiding the worst-case scenarios outlined above. It is 
certainly possible for a country to begin a transition to democracy as a 
restricted democracy, with the military playing a substantial role, and to 
gradually reduce that role through time.276 Such a model may sometimes 
have the benefit of allowing for institution-building, and also allowing 
political forces to organize and to mature. Thus the steadfast opposition of 
political parties and outside observers to any military role in the new 
regime is understandable but not obviously correct. It is right to see the 
 
274. Although, some of these influences were not democratically productive. For example, there 
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military as a threat to democracy, but wrong to see it as the only threat. 
And there likely are configurations under which the military could help to 
stabilize the new regime. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
I have argued here that constitution-making should often be dominated 
by a risk-averse calculation: domestic and international policymakers 
should focus on avoiding a worst-case outcome, rather than trying to reach 
an idealized first-best world of transformative, deliberative democracy. In 
Egypt, as in many weakly institutionalized environments, the risks of the 
constitution-making process may outweigh its benefits. The country 
appears unlikely to be saved through the constitution-making moment, but 
constitution-making has the risk of being a critical juncture that puts Egypt 
on the path of authoritarian, weakly democratic, or unstable regimes. 
More generally, a better understanding of constitution-making in many 
situations is one that does not view these moments as a higher form of 
politics, but instead as a more dangerous form of politics, because of the 
absence of clearly defined and credible institutions and rules. There are 
broader lessons here for transitions from non-democratic regimes: the crisis 
of order may sometimes be a more fundamental problem than the need to 
construct democracy.277 The breakdown of basic institutional order that 
attends these moments is a serious challenge for democratic transitions. 
Political actors in the new regime are often forced to choose between two 
undesirable options, salvaging some aspects of the non-democratic regime 
as building blocks for the new order, or destroying them, thus making a 
crisis of order and capacity worse.278 An important paradox of modern 
regime transition is that it might sometimes be necessary to preserve 
undemocratic enclaves in a new regime in order to create a viable 
democracy.279 
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